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REGULATING PATENTS 
  
 Imagine the following scenario:  In 1972, instead of creating 
the Environmental Protection Agency,1 Congress passes the 
Environmental Pollution Act, which states that “no person shall be 
permitted to emit any pollutant in a manner that unreasonably 
endangers human health” and provides for civil penalties and 
injunctive relief against violators.  After the statute takes effect, eager 
plaintiffs begin filing cases against industries that they believe are 
breaking the law.  The courts are then faced with the task of sorting 
out which suits are meritorious and which are not, a process that 
naturally involves interpreting what it means for a pollutant to 
“unreasonably” endanger human health. 
Immediately, of course, the courts run into significant 
difficulties.  A factory that is emitting significant amounts of mercury 
directly into a source of drinking water is obviously in violation, but 
what about a factory that emits smaller amounts of mercury into the 
ocean?  What about a factory that emits substantial quantities of 
carbon monoxide, a known carcinogen, but has installed cutting-edge 
technology to mitigate these emissions as much as possible?  Or 
consider a third factory that produces water bottles made with BPA, a 
chemical that may (or may not) cause adverse health effects in 
humans.2  This factory could cease using BPA in its manufacturing 
processes but that would mean inferior bottles, perhaps without any 
environmental benefit. 
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Not surprisingly, courts find themselves poorly equipped to 
evaluate the relevant scientific and economic questions.  They cannot 
determine consistently or reliably how harmful a particular pollutant 
really is, and in what doses.  They struggle with the inevitable 
economic tradeoffs involved in banning environmental pollutants.  If 
restricting the emission of a chemical will save one life but lead to the 
loss of 10,000 jobs, does that chemical pose an “unreasonable” threat 
to human health?  The courts have no workable metric for deciding.  
The result is a patchwork of environmental prohibitions that may not 
do much to protect humans or the environment, and may involve 
counter-productive and costly economic tradeoffs that few people 
would be willing to accept. 
The institutional arrangement described in this scenario will 
likely strike most readers as inadvisable.  It makes little sense to 
entrust generalist judges with a task as technically complicated as 
determining which environmental emissions are dangerous, and at 
what economic cost they should be regulated.  The courts have limited 
technical expertise and little institutional ability to conduct the 
necessary studies and analyses.  If it is necessary to regulate 
environmental pollutants, better to delegate regulatory authority to the 
Environmental Protection Agency than the courts.  Congress has 
indeed taken this approach. 
As ill-conceived as judge-driven environmental policy might 
seem, a similar arrangement prevails in the equally technocratic field 
of patent law.  The Patent Act is written in broad terms, permitting 
patents on any “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter.”  Congress has not significantly amended the 
Patent Act since 1952, and the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) 
has never had substantive rulemaking authority.3  Courts, therefore, 
have taken center stage.  In particular, the Federal Circuit has assumed 
near-total authority over patent policy and doctrine, which is a position 
held by no other appellate court over any area of law.  The result has 
not been felicitous.  The Federal Circuit has been roundly criticized for 
promulgating overly formalistic doctrines that ignore pragmatic 
considerations; tolerating uncertainty and confusion on key points of 
law; enhancing the power of patent holders to the point of diminishing 
                                                     
3 See Clarissa Long, The PTO and the Market for Influence in Patent Law, 157 U Pa 
L Rev 1965, 1968 (2009); Animal Legal Defense Fund v Quigg, 932 F2d 920, 930 
(Fed Cir 1991) (interpreting the Patent and Trademark Office’s rule-making 
authority as extending only to the procedures used in the course of examination). 
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innovation; and failing to distinguish technological fields in which 
patents are necessary from those in which they are not.4 
In recent years, the Supreme Court has intervened to address 
some of the Federal Circuit’s more glaring faults.  Since 2005, the 
Court has decided seven patent cases5—a startling number given the 
Court’s traditional reluctance to involve itself in patent matters.6  The 
most recent and most important of these forays came during the 
October 2009 Term, in Bilski v. Kappos.7  The case posed the question 
whether inventors could patent “business methods” (that is, processes 
for running a business that do not necessarily involve any physical 
product) or other similarly intangible processes.  Bilski held potentially 
enormous economic significance.  Thousands of patents on business 
methods and other intangible processes are granted each year, even 
though the Supreme Court had never before passed on their validity.  
Moreover, many scholars now believe that these types of patents are 
counterproductive:  By increasing transaction costs and creating 
anticommons problems, they might well discourage innovation more 
than they encourage it.8  Many commentators thus hoped that the 
Court would use Bilski to limit the sorts of intangible processes that 
can be patented. 
As it turned out, the Supreme Court did no such thing.  Rather, 
Bilski merely reaffirmed the well-known principle that “abstract ideas” 
cannot be patented, without providing guidance on whether business 
                                                     
4 See generally Dan L. Burk and Mark A. Lemley, The Patent Crisis and How the 
Courts Can Solve It 21 (Chicago 2009); James Bessen and Michael J. Meurer, 
Patent Failure (Princeton 2008); Adam B. Jaffe and Josh Lerner, Innovation and Its 
Discontents: How Our Broken Patent System Is Endangering Innovation and 
Progress, and What To Do About It (Princeton 2004). 
5 See Bilski v Kappos, 130 S Ct 3218, 3225 (2010); Quanta Computer, Inc v LG 
Electronics, Inc, 553 US 617, 625 (2008); Microsoft Corp v AT&T Corp, 550 US 
437, 447 (2007); KSR Intern Co v Teleflex Inc, 550 US 398, 407 (2007); 
MedImmune, Inc v Genentech, Inc, 549 US 118, 122 (2007); eBay Inc v 
MercExchange, LLC, 547 US 388, 391 (2006); Merck KGaA v Integra Lifesciences 
I, Ltd, 545 US 193, 202 (2005).   The Court has also granted certiorari in three more 
patent cases for the 2010 Term.  See Microsoft Corp v. i4i Limited Partnership, et al, 
2010 WL 3392402 (2010); Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior 
University v. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc, 131 S Ct 501 (2010); Global-Tech 
Appliances, Inc v. SEB S.A., 131 S Ct 458 (2010). 
6 See John M. Golden, The Supreme Court As “Prime Percolator,” 56 UCLA L Rev 
657, 658 (2009) (“[T]he Supreme Court has, in the past six years, asserted its 
dominion over patent law with frequency and force.”). 
7 130 S Ct 3218 (2010). 
8 See Burk and Lemley, The Patent Crisis at 31 (cited in note 4). 
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methods and software algorithms are abstract ideas, or even explaining 
how to define abstract ideas in the first instance.9  It is easy to view 
this outcome as a lost opportunity for the Court to correct the Federal 
Circuit’s excesses. 
But it is worth pausing to consider more thoroughly what, 
precisely, the Supreme Court could or should have done.  Whether to 
allow patents on business methods is a highly complex economic 
question, one that requires balancing the incentives for innovation 
provided by patents against the costs that monopoly rights impose 
upon innovators and market entrants.  These issues are layered upon 
the technological complexity that surrounds patent law.  To make 
sensible judgments, courts must first understand the technology and 
markets involved, and then parse the economic details. 
These are tasks to which courts have never been well-suited.  
Indeed, the courts themselves have implicitly recognized this fact—
including prominently in Bilski.  There, the Court acknowledged that 
questions of patentability should be resolved with reference to 
economics, with patents granted only where they will promote, rather 
than hinder, innovation.10  Yet the majority did not attempt any such 
analysis.  Instead the justices fell back on traditional tools of statutory 
interpretation: text, doctrine, and history.  Perhaps likewise 
recognizing their own limitations, the judges on the Federal Circuit 
have appeared equally unwilling to engage the key economic issues at 
anything other than a doctrinal level, in Bilski or elsewhere. 
These are not earthshaking revelations.  In areas of regulation 
ranging from securities, to pharmaceutical drugs, to transportation, to 
the environment, policymakers have turned instead to expert 
administrative agencies, perhaps because they understood the 
institutional deficiencies of courts  This general trend towards agency 
policymaking in technical fields comes with good reason.  Absent 
input from an agency or the legislature, the federal courts have 
repeatedly proved inadequate to the task of setting sound patent 
policy.  Yet the institutional design for patent law remains an outlier.  
Patent law is a highly technically complex regulatory field controlled 
entirely by the courts.  Similarly, the PTO is one of the only federal 
administrative agencies to lack any semblance of substantive rule-
making authority. 
                                                     
9 See Bilski, 130 S Ct at 3225. 
10 See id at 3228–29. 
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The time has come to consider reorienting patent law’s 
institutional arrangements to bring them more into line with the rest of 
the administrative state.  And the most straightforward means of 
achieving this would be for Congress to endow the PTO with 
substantive rule-making authority. 
Such a change could produce significant benefits for patent 
law.  A properly empowered PTO could bring expertise and 
institutional resources to bear on complex questions of patent policy to 
a degree unthinkable within the federal courts.  In addition, the patent 
office currently produces enormous quantities of useful information 
but has no reliable mechanism for transmitting that information to the 
Federal Circuit, in part because the Federal Circuit does not have the 
proper incentives to accept and utilize that information.  Substantive 
rule-making power would allow the PTO to utilize its substantial 
informational resources in crafting intelligent patent policy, and would 
permit the agency to design rules that respond to particular 
technological developments in specific fields.  Where Federal Circuit 
hegemony has failed to generate sensible patent policy, intervention by 
the PTO may yet succeed. 
My argument is comparative, first and foremost.  It may be that 
patent questions should be decided with respect to moral or 
deontological considerations, not economic ones.  However, modern 
theories of patent law center almost entirely around economic 
considerations.11  Economics plays as large a role in contemporary 
understandings of the shape and scope of patent law as it does in 
nearly any other field.  Accordingly, I simply adopt an economic 
perspective here while recognizing that some observers may favor a 
different approach.   Similarly, I do not argue that all or even most 
areas of regulation should be entrusted to agencies rather than courts.  
Rather, the point is that the case for agency authority is at least as 
strong for patent law as it is in environmental law, securities law, food 
and drug law, or any other major area of regulation.12  Agencies have 
long held primary substantive rule-making authority in those fields 
and many others.  Unless one believes that the administrative state 
                                                     
11 See, for example, Burk and Lemley, The Patent Crisis at 66 (cited in note 4) (“It is 
true that there have been a few theories of patent law based in moral right, reward, or 
distributive justice, but to be blunt they are hard to take seriously as explanations for 
the actual scope of patent law.”). 
12 See Part II.F. 
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should be dismantled wholesale, there is no compelling reason to resist 
granting substantive rule-making authority to the PTO. 
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I describes the Bilski 
decision and explains how it exposes courts’ fundamental inability to 
solve the technically complex problems that surround patent law.  Part 
II explores the reasons behind the courts’ historical dominance of 
patent law in contrast to the power of agencies in other fields, and 
concludes that it is little more than a historical accident.  Part III lays 
out the affirmative case for granting substantive rule-making authority 
to the PTO and addresses possible objections to that new institutional 
arrangement.  There is no reason, modern or historical, for allowing 
the judiciary to continue as the sole steward of patent law and policy. 
 
I.  BILSKI AND THE FAILURE OF THE COURTS 
 
 At the most basic level, the objective of the patentability 
doctrines—those legal rules that govern which inventions can be 
patented and which cannot—is to allow patents on inventions that 
would not otherwise be created (or disseminated) without the incentive 
provided by a monopoly right.13  It is for this reason that an invention 
must be novel14 and non-obvious15 in order to be patentable.  It is not 
necessary to provide inventors with incentives to create or disclose an 
invention that is already in the public domain.16 
 In addition to these limitations, patent law also imposes the 
baseline requirement that an invention comprise “patentable subject 
matter.”  That is, the invention must be a “process, machine, 
                                                     
13 See Robert Patrick Merges and John Fitzgerald Duffy, Patent Law and Policy: 
Cases and Materials 253–256 (LexisNexis 3d ed 2007) (describing the incentive 
systems meant to drive the patent law); Donald S. Chisum et al, Principles of Patent 
Law 6 (West 1998).  There are other potential objectives behind the rules governing 
patentability, including reducing transaction costs for follow-on inventors, see 
Michael A. Heller and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Science 698, 700 (1998), avoiding rent-
dissipating races, see Mark F. Grady and Jay I. Alexander, Patent Races and Rent 
Dissipation, 78 Va L Rev 305, 317 (1992), and avoiding duplicative research, see 
generally Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J L 
& Econ 265 (1977).  I do not pause to dwell on these additional goals because they 
are essentially aligned with the objective of dynamic efficiency: the production of 
the greatest amount of innovation at the lowest economic cost. 
14 35 USC § 102. 
15 35 USC § 103. 
16 See Chisum, Principles of Patent Law at 335 (cited in note 13). 
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manufacture, or composition of matter.”17  Courts and commentators 
have understood this language to mean that there are some types of 
inventions (and perhaps even some fields of endeavor) that cannot be 
patented even if they are novel and non-obvious.18 
What could be the purpose of barring patents on certain types 
of inventions, even if they are novel and not obvious?  If there is a 
basis for doing so, it must be that certain types of patents will be more 
harmful than beneficial—that the inefficiencies caused by allowing 
patents on these inventions will exceed the benefits of providing 
additional inducement for their development.19  Indeed, it is now clear 
that patents function very differently in different industries.20  In some 
industries they are almost certainly essential to incentivizing 
innovation; in others they likely inhibit research and development 
more than they promote it.21 
The reasons are multiple.  In some industries where up-front 
innovation costs are high but copying costs are low, firms would lack 
the proper incentives to innovate without the ability to acquire 
patents.22  For instance, no pharmaceutical company will attempt to 
bring a drug to market without a patent for fear that a generic 
competitor will simply appropriate the idea.23  On the other hand, in 
other industries first-mover advantage and other non-patent business 
strategies can be enough to encourage firms to proceed with research 
and development, even where patent protection is uncertain.24  In these 
industries, competition is the best catalyst of invention.  The software, 
computer, and semiconductor industries appear to fit this mold.25 
                                                     
17 35 USC § 101. 
18 See Michael Abramowicz and John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market 
Experimentation, 83 NYU L Rev 337, 344 (2008). 
19 See Burk and Lemley, The Patent Crisis at 31 (cited in note 4). 
20 See id at 27–40. 
21 See id at 40. 
22 See, for example, Burk & Lemley, The Patent Crisis at 66–68 (cited in note 4); 
Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Patent Law, 75 Texas L Rev 
989, 994–95 (1997); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: 
Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U Chi L Rev 1017, 1024–28 (1989). 
23 See Burk and Lemley, The Patent Crisis at 143–44 (cited in note 4). 
24 See, for example,  Dennis D. Crouch, The Patent Lottery: Exploiting Behavioral 
Economics for the Common Good, 16 Geo Mason L Rev 141, 145–46 (2008) 
(“Many non-patent factors drive innovation and can in some instances make patents 
irrelevant.  These include the desire for a first-mover advantage . . . .”); Burk and 
Lemley, The Patent Crisis at 72–73 (cited in note 4). 
25 See Burk and Lemley, The Patent Crisis at 82–85 (cited in note 4). 
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At the same time, the proliferation of patents almost certainly 
threatens greater economic harm in some industries than in others.26  
For instance, some industries are characterized by patent thickets27 and 
anticommons problems.28  Firms that wish to innovate must negotiate 
licenses on large numbers of extant patents and consequently face high 
transaction costs.29  The software and semiconductor industries are 
widely believed to suffer from these problems.30  Conversely, the 
biotechnology industry may be much less susceptible to growth in 
transaction costs, as each pharmaceutical compound is typically 
covered by only one patent.31  Under these circumstances, a sensible 
patent policy would prohibit, or at least limit, patents within certain 
technological fields while allowing them in others. 
 
A.  JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT OF PATENT POLICY 
 
It was within this context that Bilski reached the Supreme 
Court.  The case concerned a patent on a method for hedging risk in 
the movement of commodities prices, which is a prototypical method 
for doing business.  Over the past several decades, business methods,32 
                                                     
26 See Mark A. Lemley, Industry-Specific Antitrust Policy for Innovation (Stanford 
Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 397 Sept 2010), online at 
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1670197 (visited Oct 3, 2010). 
27 “Patent thickets” arise in industries in which multiple overlapping patents cover a 
single invention.  See Burk and Lemley, The Patent Crisis at 77–78 (cited in note 4).  
For instance, there might be hundreds of patents that read on a single integrated 
circuit design, many of them on the same parts of the circuit. 
28 A patent anticommons is a situation in which multiple patents cover sequential 
parts of an invention.  See Burk and Lemley, The Patent Crisis at 75–77 (cited in 
note 4).  For instance, there might be a patent on a purified DNA sequence, a patent 
on the protein that this DNA sequence codes for, a patent on a process for artificially 
manufacturing this protein, a patent on a pharmaceutical compound incorporating 
this protein, and a patent on a means for delivering this compound to a patient (such 
as a pill).  A pharmaceutical company that wished to manufacture this pill would be 
forced to license all of these patents.  The threat of an anticommons is the 
explanation usually offered for the prohibition on patenting abstract ideas.  See 
Diamond v Diehr, 450 US 175, 185 (1981). 
29 See Heller and Eisenberg, 280 Science at 700 (cited in note 13). 
30 See Burk and Lemley, The Patent Crisis at 86–92 (cited in note 4). 
31 See Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things to Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (and 
One Not to), 48 BC L Rev 148, 149 (2007). 
32 See State Street Bank v Signature Financial Group, 149 F3d 1368, 1375 (Fed Cir 
1998). 
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tax methods,33 software algorithms,34 and other intangible processes 
have been patented in increasing numbers.35  Yet the Court had never 
before considered whether these types of inventions were patentable.  
Meanwhile, some scholars have suggested that patents in many of 
these fields were unnecessary, or even counterproductive.  Many 
observers believed that the Supreme Court agreed and would impose 
significant limits on patents in these fields.36 
In Bilski, the Court acknowledged the role that subject matter 
limitations should play in restricting patenting where it might be 
harmful.  As Justice Kennedy explained for the Court, “[i]f a high 
enough bar is not set . . . patent examiners and courts could be flooded 
with claims that would put a chill on creative endeavor and dynamic 
change.”37  For all intents and purposes, however, the Court stopped 
there.  It resisted calls for categorical limitations on patents for 
business methods and similar inventions,38 and it refused to provide 
guidance on how patent law should “strik[e] the balance between 
protecting inventors and not granting monopolies over procedures that 
others would discover . . . .”39  The Court’s only instructions for the 
rest of us were a generic reaffirmation that abstract ideas cannot be 
patented and a declaration that Bernard Bilski’s particular patent was 
invalid on that ground.  The Court’s opinion did not specify any 
helpful legal standard to employ when determining whether an 
invention constitutes an abstract idea.40 
                                                     
33 See for example Transamerica Life Ins Co v. Lincoln Nat Life Ins Co, 597 F Supp 
2d 897 (ND Iowa 2009). 
34 See generally In re Beauregard, 53 F3d 1583 (Fed Cir 1995) (allowing software 
patent); In re Alappat, 33 F3d 1526, 1544 (Fed Cir 1994) (en banc) (same). 
35 See Justin M. Lee, The Board Bites Back: Bilski and the B.P.A.I., 24 Berkeley 
Tech L J 49, 49 (2009) (describing the “period of considerable expansion in subject-
matter eligibility”). 
36 See, for example, Joe Mullin, Supreme Skepticism Over Bilski Claims Puts 
Method Patents on Shaky Ground, The AmLaw Daily (Nov 9, 2009), online at 
http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2009/11/bilski.html (visited Dec 29, 
2010); Tony Mauro, Bilski Case Provokes Patent Skepticism from Justices, The 
BLT: The Blog of Legal Times (Nov 9, 2009), online at 
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2009/11/bilski-case-provokes-patent-skepticism-
from-justices.html (visited Dec 29, 2010). 
37 Bilski, 130 S Ct at 3229. 
38 See id at 3227. 
39 Id at 3229. 
40 See id at 3226–27. 
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Justice Stevens’ concurrence fared slightly better.  The 
majority of the  concurrence is a lengthy analysis of text, precedent, 
and history—the standard tools of statutory interpretation.41  However, 
at the end of his opinion Justice Stevens explained that patents should 
be granted only when “a patent monopoly is necessary to motivate the 
invention” and attempted to determine whether business methods 
qualify under that standard.42  After canvassing some of the scholarly 
literature on business method patents, Stevens concluded that they did 
not.43   
This is an improvement on the majority, but it demonstrates the 
limitations of judicial analysis.  Stevens cites many leading patent 
scholars,44 but he does not so much as mention any of the scholars 
who support business method patents.45  The concurrence does not 
grapple with the competing positions; the case against business 
methods is stated in conclusory fashion.46  Accordingly, it is difficult 
to have much confidence in Justice Stevens’ analysis, even if one were 
inclined to credit the Supreme Court for an approach that could not 
garner five votes.47 
1.  Patent economics in the courts.  To some, the Court’s 
general unwillingness to analyze came as a disappointment.  But it is 
easy to understand the Supreme Court’s reticence.  Suppose that the 
Court was willing to consider the possibility that patents should not be 
allowed in certain technological fields, or at least that the bar to them 
                                                     
41 See id at 3231–52 (Stevens concurring in the judgment). 
42 Id at 3253 (Stevens concurring in the judgment) (quotation marks omitted). 
43 See id at 3252–56. 
44 See id. 
45 See, for example, Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property?  
A Classical Liberal Response to a Premature Obituary, 62 Stan L Rev 455, 484 
(2010); Brief of Dr. Ananda Chakrabarty as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 
Bilski v. Kappos, No 08-964, at *15–*23 (filed Aug 6, 2009) (available on Westlaw 
at 2009 WL 2481328) (written by Richard A. Epstein and F. Scott Kieff). 
46 Notably, the only concession Justice Stevens makes to countervailing argument is 
one sentence buried in a footnote: “Concededly, there may some methods of doing 
business that do not confer sufficient first-mover advantages.”  Bilski, 130 S Ct at 
3254 n 51 (Stevens concurring in the judgment), citing Michael Abramowicz and 
John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market Experimentation, 83 NYU L Rev 
337, 340–42 (2008). 
47 I mean to take no position on the underlying question of whether business methods 
should be patentable.  But I hasten to add that if I were forced to choose a side I 
would most likely agree with Justice Stevens.  My criticism of his analysis has 
nothing to do with my view of his ultimate conclusion. 
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should be raised substantially.  How was the Court to judge whether it 
should reduce patenting of business methods, or tax strategies, or 
software, or any number of other possible fields of endeavor?  These 
are complicated economic questions with difficult empirical 
dimensions, precisely the type of questions that courts are not well 
positioned to answer.  Courts have no resources to conduct economic 
studies and no staff qualified to interpret them.48  Typically, a court is 
limited to perusing the amicus briefs filed by outside parties, most of 
whom have a vested interest in the outcome of the case.49  These are 
not reliable, neutral sources of information, much less comprehensive 
examinations of such complicated issues.  Nor do courts have the 
capacity to compare and evaluate competing technical arguments, 
which the two sides to an issue will inevitably provide.50  The 
shortcomings of even the Bilski concurrence lay bare these limitations.  
Not surprisingly, then, evidence indicates that the Federal Circuit is 
not significantly influenced by amicus briefs.51  This may very well be 
for the best. 
This issue is not limited to business method patents.  For 
instance, a district court recently declared that isolated and purified 
gene sequences are unpatentable as “products of nature.”52  This 
would be a momentous ruling were it to stand.  Molecular genetics is a 
multi-billion dollar industry in the United States alone, and many 
firms have business models dependent largely on obtaining patents on 
gene sequences.  Eliminating gene patents might dampen important 
innovation.  On the other hand, doing so might reduce the transaction 
costs involved in developing pharmaceuticals and gene therapies.53  
Not surprisingly, the district court opinion mentioned none of these 
                                                     
48 See Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures 120 Yale L J 2, 20–25 (2010). 
49 In some cases a court could retain a special master to evaluate the economic issues 
presented by a particular case.  This might well be an improvement on typical 
judicial decision-making.  At the limit, however, it reduces to ad hoc expert 
decision-making—a less desirable version of typical agency action.  I discuss this 
point further below. 
50 See Richard Posner, The Law and Economics of the Economic Expert Witness, 13 
J Econ Persp 91, 96 (1999). 
51 See Colleen V. Chien, Patent Amicus Briefs: What the Courts’ Friends Can Teach 
Us About the Patent System, U Cal Irvine L Rev (forthcoming) (manuscript at 25–
28) (finding that amicus briefs exert very little influence on the Federal Circuit), 
online at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1608111 (visited Oct 3, 2010). 
52 See Association for Molecular Pathology v US Patent and Trademark Office, 702 
F Supp 2d 181, 222 (SDNY 2010). 
53 See Heller and Eisenberg, 280 Science at 700 (cited in note 13). 
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possible economic consequences.  Instead the judge presented a 
straightforward doctrinal analysis of whether “purification” was 
enough to transform a natural product into a patentable invention.54 
The result of Bilski is to return the issue to the Federal Circuit 
and allow that body to develop the law further.  But it is hard to 
imagine that court faring much better.  With the same lack of 
resources and absence of staff expertise, the Federal Circuit is no 
better equipped to make difficult economic judgments than the 
Supreme Court.  The Circuit decides a large number of patent cases 
every year, but those cases only represent a small fraction of the 
economic activity involving patents in any given industry.  While any 
court will struggle with complex economic issues, it is particularly 
difficult for a court to ascertain the answer to questions such as 
whether patents are harmful or beneficial within a given field.  The 
problem is that the vast majority of the relevant economic action takes 
place outside of the courtroom.  Patents will be harmful where they 
create thickets or anticommons and raise transaction costs for new 
innovators;55 they will be beneficial where they incentivize invention 
that would not otherwise occur.  Courts cannot observe either activity.
 It is certainly not news that courts struggle with difficult 
economic questions.  Scholars have recognized this issue most 
prominently within the field of antitrust—the other area of federal law 
in which judges are the primary policymakers56  Yet this criticism has 
largely been confined to antitrust law.  The likely explanation is that 
the Sherman Antitrust Act explicitly calls for an economic judgment: 
any contract “in restraint of trade” is illegal.57  Patent law, by contrast, 
embeds its economic judgments within doctrine.  An invention is only 
patentable if it is novel, nonobvious, and involves a “process, machine, 
                                                     
54 See Association for Molecular Pathology, 702 F Supp 2d at 226–27. 
55 See Ian Ayres and Paul Klempere, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without 
Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-
Injunctive Remedies, 97 Mich L Rev 985, 1018–20 (1999); Heller and Eisenberg, 
280 Science at 698–99 (cited in note 13). 
56 See Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 249 (Aspen 7th ed 2007); Michael 
R. Baye and Joshua D. Wright, Is Antitrust Too Complicated for Generalist Judges?, 
J L and Econ (forthcoming 2010), online at 
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1319888 (visited Nov 7, 2010); William Kovacic 
and Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking (U of 
Cal–Berkeley, Center for Competition Policy Working Paper No. CPC99-09, 
October 1999), online at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract_id=506284. 
57 15 USC § 1. 
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manufacture, or composition of matter,” and none of these doctrinal 
elements overtly demands an economic analysis.  Patent judges have 
thus clung tenaciously to the legal language of patent law, refusing to 
engage directly with the economic issues at hand. 
This arrangement would be suitable if there were reason to 
believe that the Patent Act already incorporated sound economic 
judgment on the part of Congress.  While such a claim might have 
been sustainable fifty years ago, it no longer appears plausible.  The 
Patent Act was last amended in 1952, a time that precedes almost all 
business method, software, and tax patents, and even the modern 
computer and semiconductor industries.58  These industries may very 
well have different market structures than other major areas of 
patenting such as machinery and pharmaceuticals, and those different 
market structures may dictate divergent reactions to the availability of 
patents.  If patents diminish innovation and social welfare in some of 
these fields more than they increase it, as critics of expansive patent 
rights maintain, then the patent system ought to adjust accordingly.  It 
makes no sense to pretend that Congress somehow managed to embed 
the proper rules into the Act’s terse language in 1952 (and before), and 
that the courts need merely divine Congress’s intent.  If courts are not 
well equipped to make economic judgments, there is no reason to 
believe that decades-old verbal formulations provide the answers. 
2.  The particular problems with subject matter distinctions.  
These problems are endemic to any situation involving complex 
empirical questions.  But the difficulties the Supreme Court would 
have in formulating a sensible doctrine of patentable subject matter 
run even deeper.  Suppose that the Court wished to wall off business 
methods as unpatentable.  Consider the various verbal formulations 
that the Court might have adopted.  The Federal Circuit’s original test 
asked whether an invention created a “useful, concrete, and tangible 
result.”59  This is far too capacious.  Nearly any type of business 
method—a method of sale, a means of organizing a business, or a 
strategy for structuring taxable income—creates a tangible result of 
one type or another, if only indirectly, simply by altering the way in 
which people exchange goods or services. 
In Bilski, the Federal Circuit settled on what is known as the 
“machine-or-transformation test”: an invention is patentable if it 
                                                     
58 See Long, 157 U Pa L Rev at 1968 (cited in note 3). 
59 In re Alappat, 33 F3d 1526, 1544 (Fed Cir 1994) (en banc). 
  
 REGULATING PATENTS 15 
involves a machine or transforms matter.60  But this test might itself be 
dramatically under- or over-inclusive, depending upon how 
capaciously it is understood.  The principal issue is whether a general-
purpose computer, appended to a claim, would constitute a machine 
for purposes of the test.  If it did not, the test would likely exclude a 
host of inventions not commonly thought of as business methods, 
including software.  This may be undesirable.  And if the machine-or-
transformation test did permit the patenting of abstract process claims 
to which a general-purpose computer had been attached, it would 
likely have little or no force.  A large proportion of modern business 
methods require a computer to run.  (Consider Amazon.com’s 
archetypal “one-click” patent.61)  Requiring a computer as an element 
would not greatly limit the scope of patent claims. 
Finally, the Court could have declared as a matter of doctrine 
that “business methods cannot be patented.”  But precisely defining 
“business method” is not a trivial exercise.  After all, most 
inventions—from farm machinery to pharmaceuticals to industrial 
processes—are “methods of running a business” in the most general 
sense.  Business methods are defined most prominently by what they 
are not, namely tangible objects.  Similar problems of definition will 
plague attempts to flesh out the Supreme Court’s prohibition on 
“abstract ideas” as well, especially considering that the Court rejected 
the machine-and-transformation test as the sole guide for determining 
whether a patent was merely an abstract idea.62 
The courts could commence the laborious process of drawing a 
boundary around the concept of business methods, but they would face 
a patent bar working to find new ways to draft patents to evade the 
courts’ rules.  The result would be a flood of litigation on the issue and 
a substantial degree of uncertainty regarding what is patentable.  
While the Federal Circuit is in the process of deciding which 
inventions are business methods and which are not, the PTO might 
well be making its own errors of under- and over-inclusion—issuing 
patents that are later understood to be invalid, or refusing to grant 
patents that it should.  These errors create significant social costs.63 
                                                     
60 See In re Bilski, 545 F3d 943, 957 (Fed Cir 2008) (en banc). 
61 See Amazon.com, Inc v Barnesandnoble.com, Inc, 239 F3d 1343 (Fed Cir 2001). 
62 Bilski, 130 S Ct at 3226. 
63 See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw U L Rev 
1495, 1503–08 (2001); Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of 
Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 Minn L Rev 101 (2006). 
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Eventually, the courts likely would settle upon a workable 
understanding of business methods and the number of difficult cases 
would diminish.  Yet this would only return to the earlier problem: in 
the course of finding a common law solution to the question of what 
constitutes a business method patent, there is no reason to believe that 
the Federal Circuit would have the ability or the inclination to evaluate 
the difficult economic issues involved.  Indeed, there is evidence that 
the Federal Circuit relies even more heavily on doctrine and is even 
more reticent than the Supreme Court to address patent questions in 
economic terms.64 
 
B.   OTHER PATENT DOCTRINES 
 
Bilski lays bare the courts’ ultimate unsuitability in deciding 
the complex economic questions that underlie patent law.  But the 
issue of patentable subject matter is hardly the only area in which the 
courts’ shortcomings are manifest.  In a number of areas, courts 
struggle badly with the tradeoff between allowing too few patents and 
too many. 
There are more optimistic views.  In their recent book, The 
Patent Crisis and How the Courts Can Solve It, Dan Burk and Mark 
Lemley offer the most sustained and cogent defense to date of the role 
of courts in managing the patent system.  Burk and Lemley advance 
and defend the idea, described earlier, that patents function differently 
across industries.  Certain industries will benefit from broader patents 
and others from narrower ones; some from compulsory licensing and 
others from stronger patent remedies; some from higher barriers to 
patenting (utility, nonobviousness, or written description65) and others 
from lower.  Burk and Lemley argue that courts already possess the 
tools to fine-tune the rules governing patents in various industries.  
They point to a variety of doctrines—“patent levers”—that courts can 
employ to adjust the power or scope of patents from industry to 
industry, and they argue that the federal courts have in effect already 
created different patent rules for different types of technology.66 
                                                     
64 See Lee, 120 Yale L J at 25–35 (cited in note 48). 
65 The more demanding the requirements of utility and non-obviousness, the fewer 
the patents, and the later they will be granted in the life cycle of an invention. 
66 See Dan L. Burk and Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va L Rev 
1575, 1674–75 (2003). 
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Although Burk and Lemley’s argument is nuanced and 
thorough, and they leave little doubt that these patent levers exist,67 
their analysis does not indicate that courts are using them properly in 
most circumstances.  To the contrary, Burk and Lemley describe 
industry after industry in which the Federal Circuit has failed to select 
what the authors believe to be the proper rule, leading to patents that 
may do more harm than good.68  After all, their book is titled The 
Patent Crisis.  They obviously agree with the broad consensus that the 
patent system is functioning very poorly.69 
Burk and Lemley are also forthright in admitting that scholars 
may disagree about the rules that should govern each of these 
industries.70  They characterize the outstanding questions as difficult 
economic issues that remain to be resolved by experts, and quite 
rightly so.71  Yet there is no reason to believe—and every reason to 
doubt—that courts could play that expert role.  A number of recent 
cases have grappled with the doctrines of utility and non-obviousness 
in ways that could significantly alter the numbers and timing of patent 
grants.72  But courts deciding those cases have little idea whether they 
are balancing properly between these competing concerns.  In general, 
they hardly appear to be trying.  The cases are largely bereft of any 
indication that economic concerns played a role in the judges’ 
decision-making; their decisions are driven by text, precedent, and 
other traditional legal tools.  
This sketch of some of the economic questions that courts have 
left unanswered does not even touch upon the technical and scientific 
issues that judges are asked to decide in the course of nearly every 
patent case, issues that they are equally poorly prepared to handle.  In 
the regular course of litigation, generalist judges must determine 
                                                     
67 See Burk and Lemley, Patent Crisis at 109–30 (cited in note 4). 
68 See, for example, id at 116 (describing Federal Circuit misuse of person having 
ordinary skill in the art); id at 148–49 (describing numerous ways in which the 
courts have formulated poor patent policy to govern the biotechnology industry); id 
at 159 (stating, with respect to software patents, “[u]nfortunately, the Federal 
Circuit’s current standard seems to be precisely backwards”); id at 160 (criticizing 
courts’ awards of excessive damages in software cases). 
69 See generally Jaffe and Lerner, Innovation and Its Discontents (cited in note 4) 
(describing the ways in which the patent system is functioning poorly); Bessen and 
Meurer, Patent Failure (cited in note 4) (same). 
70 See Burk and Lemley, Patent Crisis at 169 (cited in note 4). 
71 See id. 
72 See, for example, KSR Intern Co v Teleflex Inc, 550 US 398 (2007) (revising the 
standard for obviousness). 
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whether a patent describes a technically complex invention sufficiently 
well that a person skilled in the relevant technology could recreate it, 
or whether an invention is obvious in light of two or more prior 
inventions in related fields.  It is almost to state the obvious to observe 
that untrained judges cannot perform these tasks well.  Even the 
Federal Circuit is little better off: of the twelve active judges on the 
court, only five of them had practiced or taught patent law before 
joining the court, only six have even undergraduate degrees in 
technical fields, and none has an advanced degree in economics.73  It is 
thus puzzling that the Federal Circuit has managed to acquire a 
reputation as an expert court. 
Of course, it is possible that even after sustained examination 
some of these patent questions will not yield economic answers.  The 
economics of innovation are hardly straightforward.  But if any 
institutional actor is capable of providing such answers, it is not likely 
to be the federal courts. 
 
C.  OBJECTIONS AND CAVEATS 
 
1.  The judicial role.  Some scholars and judges—indeed, many 
members of the current Supreme Court—might sidestep the foregoing 
critique on the ground that it misunderstands the judicial role.  On one 
view, deciding which inventions represent “patentable subject matter” 
simply involves interpreting section 101 of the Patent Act.  Judges, on 
this account, are meant to decide questions of statutory interpretation 
with reference only to traditional legal materials (such as statutory 
text, structure, judicial precedent, and legislative history), and not 
economic theory or empirics.74  Accordingly, this story goes, a critique 
of judges as incapable of addressing such complex economic or 
technical issues misses the mark. 
                                                     
73 See Federal Circuit—Judicial Biographies, online at 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judgbios.html (visited Sept 6, 2009). 
74 See, for example, Anthony J. Bellia, State Courts and the Interpretation of 
Federal Statutes, 59 Vand L Rev 1501, 1513 (2006), quoting 1 William Blackstone, 
Commentaries on the Laws of England 59 (1765) (“The fairest and most rational 
method to interpret the will of the legislator, is by exploring his intentions at the time 
when the law was made, by signs the most natural and probable.  And these signs are 
either the words, the context, the subject matter, the effects and consequence, or the 
spirit and reason of the law.”); William N. Eskridge, All About Words: Early 
Understandings of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 
101 Colum L Rev 990, 1000 (2001). 
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This objection might strike many as compelling.  It may be 
precisely because courts are ill-equipped to delve into complicated 
economic matters that they are best advised to adhere closely to 
traditional legal materials when interpreting statutes.  This is only a 
possibility; a full theory of statutory interpretation is well beyond the 
scope of this Article.  Regardless of the proper theory, however, the 
point is the same: there is no reason to have a patent system that does 
not structure incentives to promote innovation.  If courts, as a matter 
of institutional role, should not be taking such considerations into 
account, then responsibility for setting baseline patent rules should be 
transferred to an institution that can address such questions. 
2.  The uniqueness of patent law?  If the foregoing argument 
regarding the comparative disadvantage of courts is correct, it raises a 
separate issue: why should it apply only to patent law?  Many if not all 
common-law doctrines—such as the judge-made elements of contract 
and tort law—produce significant economic consequences.  Courts 
may be unable to address competently the economic issues presented 
by, for instance, the choice between negligence and strict liability in 
tort, or various treatments of liquidated damages clauses in contract.  
Early law and economics scholarship maintained that the common law 
would naturally evolve toward efficient rules,75 but that theory remains  
unsupported.76 
Some readers might recoil against any argument suggesting 
that classic common-law fields are better handled by institutions other 
than courts.  Even if that reaction turns out to be correct, however, it 
would not necessarily defeat the argument presented here.  There are 
several reasons to believe that judges are especially ill-suited to setting 
the rules of patent law. 
First of all, the existing rules of patent law have been roundly 
criticized, and to a degree currently unequalled within the common 
law.77  If judges appear to be performing adequately, there seems little 
                                                     
75 See Posner, Economic Analysis of the Law at 249–50 (cited in note 56). 
76 See Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J Legal Stud 51, 61–63 
(1977) (criticizing the notion that the common law necessarily evolves toward 
efficiency and offering a more realistic account of legal change); Nicola Gennaioli 
and Andrei Shleifer, Overruling and the Instability of the Law, 35 J Comp Econ 309, 
323–25 (2007) (arguing that overruling precedent leads to instability and prevents 
the common law from evolving toward efficiency). 
77 See, for example, Burk and Lemley, The Patent Crisis at 21 (cited in note 4) 
(cataloguing the various criticisms directed at patent law); Jaffe and Lerner, 
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reason to re-allocate responsibilities.  The indictment of judges as 
stewards of the patent law is driven by the fact that patent law seems 
to have strayed far from its optimal course. 
Second, the economic questions underlying patent law may 
imply be more difficult for judges than those involved in typical 
common law rules.  According to Richard Posner, “Many common 
law doctrines are economically sensible but not economically subtle . . 
. .  Their articulation in economic terms is beyond the capacity of most 
judges and lawyers, but their intuition is not.”78  (Posner contrasts 
common law doctrines with antitrust law, which he argues has been 
handled inadequately by judges.79)  In addition, patent law requires 
navigating an additional layer of technical complexity above and 
beyond the selection of an economically efficient rule.  Even if it is 
equally difficult for a court to judge the economic consequences of 
allowing patents on gene sequences and deciding tort liability on a 
negligence standard, a court must attempt the former while 
simultaneously grappling with the technical specifics of gene 
sequences and the question of how they are different from other types 
of biotechnology.80 
Another possible reason lies with the objectives embodied in 
these areas of law.  While contract and tort law may seek to balance a 
variety of consequentialist and deontological considerations—welfare 
maximization, efficiency, fairness, distributive justice, and so on81—
                                                                                                                             
Innovation and Its Discontents (cited in note 4) (same); Bessen and Meurer, Patent 
Failure (cited in note 4) (same). 
78 Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 252 (cited in note 56). 
79 See id at 300 (stating that the courts’ “touch has been less sure in antitrust cases 
than in common law cases”). 
80 Of course, some tort cases might also involve technical questions that are difficult 
for non-experts.  The point here is again comparative: patent cases will raise these 
types of issues on a much more frequent basis than typical common-law cases. 
81 See, for example, Eyal Zamir and Barak Medina, Law, Morality, and Economics: 
Integrating Moral Constraints with Economic Analysis of Law, 96 Cal L Rev 323, 
388 (2008) (“The extent to which existing contract law deviates from the efficient 
breach doctrine by ‘excessively’ deterring breaches may reflect a deontological 
constraint against promise breaking.”); Jody S. Kraus, Transparency and 
Determinacy in Common Law Adjudication: A Philosophical Defense of 
Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 Va L Rev 287, 322–23 (2007) (“[T]ort law in 
fact cognizes claims in corrective justice for the violation of a type of individual duty 
which cannot be reconstructed in consequentialist terms and so cannot be accounted 
for by the economic analysis of tort law.  These duties are ones that are necessarily 
correlative to individual rights and so allow a plaintiff to claim compensation only 
from the individual who violated the plaintiff's right.”); Kenneth W. Simons, The 
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the objectives of patent law are potentially more straightforward.  As I 
note above, patent law appears to involve only consequentialist, 
economic considerations.82  If courts are particularly adept at 
achieving fairness or justice, that may be a reason to continue 
delegating contract and tort cases to them irrespective of their 
economic shortcomings.  But if those types of deontological 
considerations are not present in patent law, the argument for vesting 
the power to make rules with a more expert technocratic body is 
strengthened. 
Finally, institutions other than the judiciary have already 
intervened significantly in typical common-law fields.  State 
legislatures frequently pass laws governing contracts, torts, and 
property.83  A substantial number of states have adopted the Uniform 
Commercial Code, a model law drafted by a panel of experts, though 
not precisely an administrative agency.84  States have also borrowed 
liberally from the Uniform Electronic Transaction Act and other 
                                                                                                                             
Hand Formula in the Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts: Encompassing Fairness as 
Well as Efficiency Values, 54 Vand L Rev 901, 908 (2001) (“A balancing approach 
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differently.”). 
82 See Burk & Lemley, The Patent Crisis at 66 (cited in note 4); Michael 
Abramowicz, The Uneasy Case for Patent Races Over Auctions, 60 Stan L Rev 803, 
809–10 (2007) (“This trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency is familiar to 
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Owners: Predatory Standards in Patent Licensing, 92 Yale L J 831, 836 (1983) 
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83 See, for example, 735 Ill Ann Stat §2-1207 (Smith-Hurd) (allowing judges to 
apportion punitive damages to the Department of Human Services); NY Pers Prop 
Law § 252(1) (McKinney) (creating a duty to return found property valued above 
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disclosures by telephonic sellers in Oregon). 
84 See, for example, Ariz Rev Stat Ann §47-9315 (West) (UCC §9-315 (ALI 1999)); 
Ohio Rev Code Ann § 1302.10 (Baldwin) (UCC § 2-207 (ALI 1961)).  All fifty 
states have adopted some form of the UCC.  See Richard B. Amandes, The Uniform 
Land Transactions Act and the Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act Twenty 
Years Later: Why Have There Been No Adoptions?, 20 Nova L Rev 1033, 1034 
(1996). 
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similar model codes drafted by expert institutions.85  An even more 
extreme example is criminal law, frequently thought of as a common-
law field but actually dominated by statutes and administrative rules.  
Nearly every crime is delineated by a statute.86  In many states those 
statutes are based in whole or in part upon the Model Penal Code, 
another model statute drafted by a panel of criminal law experts.  
Sentencing decisions, long the province of the judiciary, had been 
placed largely under the control of administrative sentencing 
commissions at both the federal and state levels until the Supreme 
Court struck down the arrangement.87  Even so, sentencing statutes 
still matter and sentencing guidelines can still be used for guidance. 
Patent law is thus striking for the confluence of an 
overmatched judiciary and an absent legislature.  It has been more than 
fifty years since Congress substantially revised the Patent Act, and the 
types of patents granted now bear little resemblance to those that 
existed in 1952.  There are few areas of law, traditional common-law 
fields included, that have involved less extra-judicial management in 
the past half-century. 
 
II.  EXPLAINING THE PTO’S PUZZLING LACK OF AUTHORITY 
 
If judges are ill-equipped to manage patent policy, why has 
Congress not delegated substantive rule-making authority to the PTO, 
as it has to so many other administrative agencies?  Patent law is one 
of the few areas of federal law that receives no meaningful input from 
an administrative agency.  With the exception of the length of the 
patent term, a single core issue over which Congress has maintained 
authority, Congress has effectively handed full control over the patent 
                                                     
85 The Uniform Electronic Transaction Act (NCCUSL 1999) has been adopted in 
forty-seven states.  A complete list is posted online at 
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system to the Federal Circuit.  Congress has, on occasion, considered 
vesting the PTO with the power to make substantive patent rules, but 
authorizing legislation has never made it out of either House.  In this 
Part, I consider several possible explanations.  The objective is both 
positive and normative.  If Congress has refrained from delegating 
authority to the PTO for some intelligible reason, that might cast doubt 
on the wisdom or likelihood of future action.  However, I conclude 
that the most likely explanation is the least satisfying one: the PTO’s 
lack of authority is likely a historical accident. 
 
A.  RENT-SEEKING 
 
It is conceivable that Congress has failed to grant the PTO 
substantive rule-making authority due to a desire to continue 
collecting rents from interest groups concerned with changes in patent 
law.88  On this theory, these interest groups would direct their 
lobbying efforts at the PTO if that body possessed substantive 
authority, and hence campaign contributions to Congress would 
diminish. 
This theory seems to have very little general explanatory 
power, regardless of context.  One could ask why Congress ever 
delegates authority, if delegating means sacrificing the opportunity to 
collect rents.  Equally and oppositely, one could ask why Congress 
would be sacrificing any opportunity by delegating if it could simply 
threaten to change the law or reclaim power at a moment’s notice.  
There is little indication that a theory of rent-seeking could explain 
Congress’s pattern of delegation or non-delegation in any set of 
contexts, much less this one in particular.  The theory is essentially 
non-falsifiable. 
                                                     
88 See Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public 
Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 Cal L Rev 1, 10 (1996); 
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Here, moreover, the evidence against the rent-seeking 
explanation is even stronger.  In the context of patent law, Congress 
has evinced comparatively little interest in collecting rents.  Congress 
adjusts the patent law very rarely—the only significant amendment to 
the Patent Act since 1952 was the Hatch-Waxman Act.89  Nor has 
Congress shown any particular interest in “rattling the cages” of its 
patent constituencies: patent reform bills rarely make it out of 
committee.  It is thus hard to imagine that Congress has refrained from 
granting rulemaking authority to the PTO in order to maximize its 
rent-seeking opportunities.  Of course, this would not be a normatively 
defensible rationale for withholding rule-making power, anyway, even 
if it were a descriptively accurate one. 
 
B.  PROPERTY RIGHTS 
 
Another potential explanation for congressional inaction is the 
nature of the rights that the PTO confers.  Congress might believe that 
the patent system should be governed by a different set of rules than 
other regulatory areas because patents are property rights, and thus 
potentially more valuable or harmful than the standard subjects of 
regulation.90 
Yet there is nothing talismanic about the notion of property.  
Whether or not patents are in fact “property” in the traditional sense—
and there is considerable debate on this point91—does not change the 
set of rights and entitlements they convey.  Patents are alienable, 
tradable rights to exclude other parties from making, using, or selling a 
particular invention—nothing more and nothing less.  In a variety of 
other contexts, Congress has delegated authority to administrative 
agencies to issue permits or award rights that may be equally valuable 
(or equally harmful).  For instance, the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) issues permits that authorize firms to pollute, and  the 
FCC awards broadcast licenses to firms that allow them to operate 
                                                     
89 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub L No 98-417, 98 
Stat 1585 (1984). 
90 For a sample of scholars who believe patent rights are property in the classical 
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radio and television stations (to name just two of many possible 
examples).  These permits are not necessarily property rights or rights 
to exclude per se, but they have many of the same effects.  They 
convey private benefits and (in many cases) negative externalities, and 
they offer business advantages to the firms that possess them.92  Under 
some conditions these types of permits can be as valuable as formal 
property rights to the firms that possess them, and equally socially 
wasteful if they are allocated improperly. 
Moreover, administrative agencies frequently make rules 
governing classical property rights of other types.  For instance, in 
many localities zoning boards have extensive authority to determine 
how private parties may use real property.   Environmental laws also 
often have substantial effects on property usage.93  It would be 
peculiar to argue that zoning boards should be abolished simply 
because property rules should never be determined by administrative 
agencies.  At bottom, there is very little that differentiates regulation 
of property (if that is indeed what patents are) from the regulation of 
any other area of private behavior.  As in any area, the institution 
charged with regulating should be the one best positioned to create 
productive incentives and minimize externalities and social costs.  
There is no reason to believe that the label of “property” is 
determinative of which institution that is. 
 
C.  STATUTORY VAGUENESS 
 
The Patent Act sets the boundaries of what inventions are 
patentable in very general terms.  Any “new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter” can be patented, 
provided that no other inventor has beaten the patentee to the 
invention.94  This lack of specificity affords an interpreter a variety of 
possibilities for including or excluding various classes of inventions or 
discoveries that are not obviously addressed by the plain terms of the 
                                                     
92 In some cases, these permits do function as rights to exclude.  For instance, if 
pollution is an essential byproduct of a particular business, and if a limited number 
of pollution permits are available, a permit to pollute may function effectively as a 
right to exclude.  Similarly, if there are only a limited number of broadcast licenses 
available in a particular market, a broadcast license is effectively a right to exclude. 
93 See, for example, Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Informational Asymmetries and the 
Rights to Exclude, 104 Mich L Rev 1835, 1843 (2006) (describing “zoning laws and 
environmental regulations” as typical land use governance mechanisms). 
94 35 USC §§ 101 & 102. 
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Act itself.  Perhaps Congress has shied away from granting substantive 
rule-making authority to the PTO because it fears that the agency will 
take undue liberties with such a vague statutory grant (and for some 
reason this fear is less serious with respect to the Federal Circuit).95 
At the outset, it is difficult to understand as a policy matter 
why Congress would be reluctant to delegate a broad swath of 
authority to an agency (rather than the Federal Circuit) absent some 
independent substantive or procedural concern about how the agency 
might use that authority.  If an agency is superior to a court at 
managing smaller regulatory responsibilities, it is not clear why the 
agency would not be similarly superior at handling larger 
responsibilities.  In fact, the broader the grant of authority from 
Congress, the more that the exercise of delegated power will resemble 
genuine policy-making, as opposed to mere implementation of the 
law.  The procedural and structural advantages (described below) that 
agencies possess in comparison to courts are most significant when 
deployed in the formulation of policy, rather than the mere execution 
of it. 
Moreover, the Patent Act is no broader or less well-defined 
than a panoply of administrative statutes under which agencies 
currently regulate.  For instance, the Occupational Health and Safety 
Act instructs the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) to adopt regulations of all potential workplace hazards 
“which most adequately assure[], to the extent feasible . . . that no 
employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional 
capacity.”96  The regulations adopted must be “reasonably necessary 
or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of 
employment.”97  The Clean Air Act authorizes the EPA to regulate 
“any air pollutant.”98  And the Endangered Species Act makes it illegal 
to “harass [or] harm” any endangered animal.99  Based on this 
language the Secretary of the Interior successfully asserted authority to 
prohibit modifications to those animals’ habitats.100  The notion that 
statutory vagueness could provide a rationale for refusing to delegate 
                                                     
95 Compare Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v American Petroleum Institute, 
448 US 607 (1980). 
96 29 USC § 655(b)(5). 
97 29 USC § 652(8). 
98 42 USC § 7521(a)(1). 
99 16 USC § 1532(19). 
100 See Babbitt v Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 US 
687, 700 (1995). 
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to an agency fails not only as a matter of logic, but as a matter of 
historical practice as well. 
 
D.  PTO EXPERTISE 
 
A number of scholars have suggested that the PTO cannot be 
trusted to employ substantive rule-making authority competently, even 
if Congress were to repose it in the agency.101  These scholars point 
out that the PTO has been roundly criticized for lackluster 
performance of its current task of examining patents.  They note as 
well that the PTO traditionally has had no policy or economic staff, 
though it has recently hired a chief economist.102  By these measures, 
the PTO appears far from prepared to assume any sort of meaningful 
substantive authority. 
But this argument does not account for the fact that the PTO is 
a creature of its circumstances.  In any administrative agency—indeed, 
in any organization—form follows function.  The PTO can hardly be 
expected to assemble an economic staff if that staff would play no 
meaningful role, limited to releasing guidance documents to which the 
Federal Circuit would not defer.  The PTO operates under conditions 
of limited resources; it would be folly for the organization to expend 
resources on extraneous staff and activities at the expense of its core 
mission of examination.  This is not to say that it would be costless for 
the PTO to assemble a full policy-making staff and transform itself 
into a regulatory entity along the lines of EPA or OSHA.  There would 
be significant transition costs, among them the hiring of significant 
numbers of staff and the restructuring of the office to emphasize the 
collection and transmission of information from patent examination.  
But this cost should be no greater than the costs borne by any other 
administrative agency, costs which hardly hindered their creation.103 
Furthermore, the current system supplies the PTO with ample 
incentives to deliberately grant too many invalid patents.  The PTO is 
                                                     
101 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, Pathological Patenting: The PTO as Cause or Cure, 104 
Mich L Rev 1559, 1575–78 (2004); Arti Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-
Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 Colum L Rev 1035, 1132–33 
(2003); John R. Thomas, The Responsibility of the Rulemaker: Comparative 
Approaches to Patent Administration Reform, 17 Berkeley Tech L J 727, 742 
(2002). 
102 See Arti K. Rai, Growing Pains in the Administrative State: The Patent Office’s 
Troubled Quest for Managerial Control, 157 U Pa L Rev 2051, 2054 (2009). 
103 See Part III. 
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funded entirely by the fees that it generates from examining patents,104 
and thus the organization benefits when it can induce private actors to 
file for patents in ever-greater numbers.  In addition, only applicants 
who have been denied patents can ever appeal to the Federal Circuit; if 
the PTO grants a patent, the matter is over.  Accordingly, the PTO has 
an incentive to err on the side of granting too many patents in order to 
avoid appeals and reversals.105  Yet these problems are hardly of the 
PTO’s own making.  It is Congress that sets the agency’s funding, and 
Congress that created one-way incentives for the agency to grant 
patents.  Endowing the PTO with substantive authority would likely 
alleviate these shortcomings, not exacerbate them.106 
There is little wrong with the patent office as a regulatory body 
that time and resources cannot cure.107  The relatively minor 
investments necessary provide no rationale for eschewing the 
institutional and structural advantages that a regulatory agency could 
supply. 
 
E.  PTO CAPTURE 
 
Finally, it is possible that Congress has shied away from 
granting substantive rulemaking authority to the PTO because of fear 
that the agency will be captured by private interests.  A number of 
scholars have voiced similar concerns, in some cases claiming that the 
PTO has already been captured, despite its currently limited role.108  
Courts are generally thought to be more resistant to capture,109 and 
                                                     
104 See Rai, 157 U Pa L Rev at 2057 & n 24 (cited in note 102). 
105 See generally Jonathan S. Masur, Patent Inflation (U of Chicago, Public Law 
Working Paper No 316, U of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No 
529), online at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1623929 (visited Nov 6, 2010). 
106 See Part III.B.1. 
107 It is worth noting that the Federal Circuit has failed to develop meaningful 
expertise despite being endowed with resources typical to an appellate court since 
1982. 
108 See Burk and Lemley, The Patent Crisis at 106–07 (cited in note 4) (arguing that 
the PTO is subject to capture); Michael J. Meurer, Patent Examination Priorities, 51 
Wm & Mary L Rev 675, 686 (2009) (same); Long, The PTO and the Market for 
Influence, 157 U Pa L Rev at 1984 (cited in note 3) (suggesting that the PTO has 
invited capture in order to increase its own stature); R. Polk Wagner, Understanding 
Patent Quality Mechanisms 25 (Jan 6, 2009), online at http:// 
www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/ipmarketplace/apr17/docs/rwagner2.pdf (visited Nov 13, 
2010) (suggesting the influence that repeat players can have on PTO behavior). 
109 See Burk and Lemley, The Patent Crisis at 106–07 (cited in note 4). 
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Congress might have delegated primary policy-making authority to the 
Federal Circuit (rather than the PTO) for this reason. 
This is a reasonable argument in favor of trusting courts, rather 
than an agency, but it is no stronger in the context of the PTO and 
patent law than it is with respect to the EPA and environmental law, or 
the Department of Labor and workplace safety law, or any of the other 
myriad areas of regulation that have come to be dominated by agency 
rulemaking.110  There is no reason to believe that the PTO is 
particularly susceptible to capture or likely to cause particular harm if 
captured.  Indeed, even critics of the PTO have suggested that it may 
be less vulnerable to capture than the typical administrative agency.111  
At the same time, other scholars have argued that the Federal Circuit 
itself may have been captured by private interests.112  As with the issue 
of agency expertise, I develop the capture analysis further in Part III.   
 The foregoing discussion was principally normative, but there 
is a related positive possibility that is worth considering.  It is entirely 
possible that Congress has refrained from delegating substantive 
authority to the PTO because of various interest-group forces (or a 
lack thereof).  It may be that powerful patent interest groups are united 
in preferring the status quo to a shift in regulatory authority even 
though they disagree about the substantive content of patent law.  Or it 
may be that Congress has had little incentive to change the law absent 
strong private preferences.  It is impossible to rule out these 
possibilities, though there is no particular evidence in support.  But it 
is worth noting that they are not normative arguments against vesting 
regulatory authority in the PTO.  If interest-group dynamics have 
prevented Congress from reallocating powers, that might indicate that 
any proposal for reform is unlikely to succeed.  (I return to this point 
in greater detail below.)  But it is not a reason for disfavoring that 
reform. 
 
F.  PATH DEPENDENCE 
 
What then is left to explain the patent office’s puzzling 
deficiency of substantive authority?  The most likely remaining 
possibility is the least satisfying if the objective is crafting sound 
                                                     
110 See Part III. 
111 See Burk and Lemley, 89 Va L Rev at 1640 and n 226 (cited in note 66). 
112 See John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 Am U L Rev 771, 
792–94 (2003). 
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patent policy.  The fact that Congress has never vested the PTO with 
substantive rule-making power may be nothing more than a historical 
accident—a path-dependent relic of early American government. 
The vast majority of administrative agencies that now possess 
regulatory authority were created during the New Deal era or later.  
For instance, Congress created the EPA and OSHA in 1970;113 the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) in 1934;114 and the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) in 1930, though it only assumed its modern 
form in 1938.115  These agencies were born during the modern era of 
technocratic bureaucracy.  The rapid growth of the American 
economy, coupled with increasing faith in the scientific and policy 
judgments of experts, led Congress to assign vast swaths of regulatory 
authority to executive-branch agencies as it came to realize that it 
could not adequately manage the economy on its own accord.116  The 
powers held by these agencies are very much a product of the time 
they came into existence. 
By contrast, the first Patent Act was passed in 1790,117 and the 
Patent and Trademark Office was created in 1836.118  In the much 
smaller and economically less complex United States of that period, 
regulatory agencies (as we understand them today) were essentially 
unknown.119  Congress and the courts were then the major engines of 
national policymaking, and an extensive federal common law of 
patents has developed in the two centuries since.  Accordingly, in the 
modern era there has never been a moment at which patent law was in 
                                                     
113See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub L No 91-596, 84 Stat 1590 
(1970); Jack Lewis, The Birth of EPA, EPA J (1985), online at 
http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/epa/15c.htm (visited Nov 7, 2010).  The so-called 
EPA Reorganization Plan Number 3, dated July 9, 1970, can be found in the 
Congressional Record, Volume 116, H 6523, 91st Congress, 2nd Session. 
114 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub L No 73-291, 48 Stat 881 (enacted June 6, 
1934), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. 
115 Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 USC § 301 et seq. 
116 See generally Stephen G. Breyer et al, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy 
14–29 (Aspen 6th ed 2006). 
117 Act of April 10, 1790, 1 Stat 109.  A pdf is available online at 
http://www.ipmall.info/hosted_resources/lipa/patents/Patent_Act_of_1790.pdf 
(visited Nov 4, 2010). 
118 Patent Act of 1836, ch 357, 5 Stat 117, online at 
http://www.ipmall.info/hosted_resources/lipa/patents/Patent_Act_of_1836.pdf 
(visited Nov 4, 2010). 
119 See generally Breyer et al, Administrative Law at 14–15 (cited in note 116). 
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need of wholesale development.  Patent law, however flawed it may 
be, has always existed in common law form.  This is unlike, for 
instance, environmental law and food and drug law, which sprang into 
existence at the federal level nearly coextensively with the EPA and 
FDA, respectively. 
Of course, Congress could have later recognized the 
inadequacies of the Federal Circuit and redistributed authority to the 
PTO.  But this type of reallocation of institutional control is extremely 
rare.  Congress’s creation of the United States Sentencing Commission 
may be the only significant instance in which Congress has delegated 
power previously held by the judiciary to an administrative agency.120  
Where judicially made rules already exist, Congress very rarely 
revisits delegations of authority.121  With the federal courts firmly 
ensconced as the expositors of patent law, Congress may not have 
understood the need for another institutional actor to play a role in the 
formation of patent policy. 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to conduct a full analysis 
of the relationship between regulatory authority and the year an 
agency was formed, and the examples proffered here are by no means 
conclusive proof of that relationship.  But they suggest a strong role 
for happenstance and inertia in the institutional assignment of policy 
responsibilities, one that may have been determinative in the case of 
the PTO.  At the same time, this might indicate that Congress is 
unlikely to take action in the future if it did not do so in the past.  This 
is a problem for all proposals for legal reform, and one that I address 
below. 
                                                     
120 See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub L No 98-473 § 212, 98 Stat 1987 
(1984). 
121 Congress frequently provides existing agencies with additional authority.  And on 
some occasions Congress will bestow substantive rulemaking power on an agency 
that did not previously possess it, but only with respect to newly created federal law.  
For instance, in 1991 the Americans with Disabilities Act granted the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission rulemaking authority regarding 
discrimination on the basis of disability.  See 42 USC § 12117 (West 2011).  But it 
did not give the EEOC rulemaking authority over previously existing federal law.  
Other than the creation of the Sentencing Commission, I have not been able to locate 
an instance in which Congress granted an agency power to make rules concerning an 
extant body of federal law that had previously been controlled by the courts, but it is 
possible that one or more exists.  (For that matter, I was also unable to find any area 
of law in which Congress has dissolved an agency with substantive rule-making 
authority and returned the federal courts to a position of singular authority over the 
law.) 
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III.  ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY 
 
In light of the courts’ failings, this Part suggests that Congress 
should consider delegating substantive rulemaking authority to the 
PTO.122  That is not to suggest that the federal courts would have no 
role in patent policy.  They would still be involved in overseeing the 
PTO’s regulatory actions, adjudicating infringement actions and 
appeals from the PTO, and making policy where the PTO has not yet 
acted.  In short, they would play the same role as the federal courts 
currently do in environmental law, securities law, and many other 
areas of federal regulation. 
The literature on congressional delegation is replete with 
analyses of the strengths and weaknesses of courts and agencies as 
potential recipients of legal and policy authority.123  Indeed, this 
                                                     
122 I mean to distinguish this from the thoughtful suggestion, offered by some 
commentators, that the PTO be afforded Chevron deference when it examines 
patents.  See, for example, Stuart Minor Benjamin and Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of 
the APA? What the Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 
Georgetown L J 269, 297–98 (2007); Dreyfuss, 104 Mich L Rev at 1577 (cited in 
note 101) (“Congress should expressly instruct courts to afford the PTO the 
deference given to federal agencies generally.”).  This kind of Chevron deference is 
probably a good idea, but it would be largely limited to protecting PTO examination 
decisions and according its ad hoc views some modicum of respect.  It would not 
make the PTO into the primary patent policymaker.  Accordingly, it is notable that 
proponents of Chevron deference oppose—or at least stop short of supporting—
delegating substantive rulemaking power to the PTO.  See Rai, 103 Colum L Rev at 
1132–33 (cited in note 101) (“Moreover, there are reasons to be wary about granting 
the PTO substantive rulemaking authority.”); Dreyfuss, 104 Mich L Rev at 1577 
(cited in note 101) (treating the PTO’s “absence of explicit rulemaking authority” as 
fixed).  Rai and Dreyfuss’s work is impressive and important, but it does not go as 
far as the argument advanced here. 
123 See generally Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated 
Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 Harv L 
Rev 1036 (2006); Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of 
Rulemaking, 85 Va L Rev 1243 (1999) (arguing for the complete abandonment of 
judicial review of agency rulemaking); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation 
and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 Colum L Rev 452 (1989) 
(arguing that judicial deference to agencies is unconstitutional); Cass R. Sunstein, 
On the Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of Agency Action, 1989 
Duke L J 522 (1989) (evaluating the costs and benefits of courts as legal authority); 
Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U Pa L Rev 
549 (1985) (concluding that courts should defer to agencies where Congress has 
endowed the agency with significant policymaking responsibility); F. Scott Kieff, 
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question encapsulates the Chevron inquiry—to what extent courts 
should defer to an agency’s statutory interpretation—and all of its 
attendant intellectual baggage.124  Arguments regarding the choice of 
institutional actor have coalesced around a finite set of issues: 
comparative expertise;125 responsiveness to public opinion;126 
procedural advantages;127 and political insulation and susceptibility to 
capture.128  However, these various arguments have hardly produced 
                                                                                                                             
The Case for Preferring Patent-Validity Litigation Over Second-Window Review and 
Gold-Plated Patents: When One Size Doesn’t Fit All, How Could Two Do the 
Trick?, 157 U Penn L Rev 1937, 1943–45 (2009) (cataloguing the strengths and 
weaknesses of agencies with particular reference to the patent context). 
124 Chevron USA, Inc v Natural Res Def Council, Inc, 467 US 837 (1984).  See 
generally Linda Jellum, Chevron’s Demise: A Survey of Chevron from Infancy to 
Senescence, 59 Admin L Rev 725 (2007) (analyzing the first prong of the Chevron 
test); Evan J. Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 BU L Rev 1271 (2008) 
(synthesizing the various Chevron rationales and proposing a new rationale); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Law and Administration after Chevron, 90 Colum L Rev 2071 (1990) 
(examining the rationale and reach of Chevron); Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. 
Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 Georgetown L J 833 (2001) (analyzing the scope 
of the Chevron doctrine). 
125 See, for example, Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference? Implied 
Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 Admin L 
Rev 735, 737 (2002) (arguing that administrative expertise provides the best 
rationale for judicial deference to administrative agencies).  See also Einer Elhauge, 
Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 Colum L Rev 2027, 2135 (2002) 
(“The legal realists’ hope that legal ambiguities could be resolved by objective 
policy expertise has long ago grown quaint . . . .  In practice, it is rare to find a field 
of social policy where there are not experts on opposing sides of an issue, . . . 
undermining any claim to an objective expert resolution.”). 
126 See, for example, William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Kevin S. Schwartz, Chevron and 
Agency Norm-Entrepreneurship, 115 Yale L J 2623, 2626 (2006) (arguing that 
agencies are more democratically accountable than judges); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power To Say What the Law Is, 115 Yale L J 
2580, 2587 (2006) (noting the executive branch's political responsiveness and 
accountability); Charles H. Koch, Jr., Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion, 
54 Geo Wash L Rev 469, 485 (1986) (arguing that agencies are better than courts at 
distilling public opinion). 
127 See, for example, Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 
85 Georgetown L J 2225, 2239 (1997) (noting the superiority of the notice and 
comment procedure over judicial decisionmaking procedures); Diver, 133 U Pa L 
Rev at 575 (cited in note 123) (noting that agency members are often involved in 
creating legislation, and therefore have a better understanding of legislative intent). 
128 See, for example, Jonathon T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative 
State: A Structural and Institutional Defense of Judicial Power over Statutory 
Interpretation, 96 Nw U L Rev 1239, 1276 (2002) (arguing that judicial power is 
superior for its political insulation); Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the 
  
 REGULATING PATENTS 34 
agreement.  Perhaps the most that can be said is that there are some 
circumstances under which delegations to agencies will be superior, 
and other under which delegations to courts will produce better 
outcomes. 
I endeavor here to avoid wading into that analytical mire.  
Rather, this Part aims to demonstrate that the affirmative case for 
delegating substantive rule-making authority over the law of patents to 
the PTO is at least as strong, if not stronger, than the typical case for 
administrative delegation; and that the drawbacks to delegating rule-
making authority to the PTO are no more significant, and likely less 
so, than in the typical administrative case.  
My point is not that the current allocation of powers between 
courts, Congress, the President, and federal agencies (other than the 
PTO) is ideal.  It may be that some agencies should be stripped of their 
authority with the power returned to the courts; it may be that agencies 
should be afforded even greater power.  One can easily name 
administrative agencies that most likely should be disbanded 
immediately.129  It is well beyond the scope of this article to defend the 
status quo fully.  Rather, I mean to argue that if one accepts the status 
quo as reasonably approximating when delegation is appropriate or 
desirable, the case for delegation to the PTO is compelling. 
 This Part proceeds in two sections.  The first section analyzes 
the PTO’s capacity to effectively implement substantive regulations 
according to standard administrative law metrics.  The second section 
describes a set of particular advantages that rule-making authority 
would provide for the patent system.  The patent system faces a unique 
set of institutional problems, but the solution lies with a familiar tool 
of administrative policy-making. 
 
A.  COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE 
 
1.  Expertise.  That agencies possess greater technical expertise 
than courts and are better positioned to address scientifically complex 
questions is by now a shibboleth of administrative theory.  Judges are 
                                                                                                                             
Courts, 72 Chi Kent L Rev 1039, 1054 (1997) (discussing the role of public choice 
in deciding between institutional actors). 
129 See, for example, Ian Urbina, Inspector General’s Inquiry Faults Regulators, NY 
Times (May 24, 2010), online at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/25/us/25mms.html (visited Dec 29, 2010) 
(describing the failings of the Minerals Management Service). 
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legal generalists, unskilled in the policy nuances of the cases that come 
before them;130 agencies are staffed by economists and experts in the 
substantive field131 who have the benefit of years of education, 
training, and experience.132  Moreover, agencies have substantial 
budgets with which they can research particular problems in depth,133 
while courts must rely upon amicus briefs and the rare appointment of 
a special master.134 
This is the conventional wisdom, and it holds true for the PTO 
as much as for the typical agency.  Even low-level employees in the 
PTO are experts in their technical fields.  Patent examiners are divided 
by technical specialty (certain examiners scrutinize only 
biotechnology patents, certain work only on semiconductor patents, 
and so forth), and each examiner must have at least a bachelor’s 
                                                     
130 See Sheila Jasanoff, Science at the Bar: Law, Science, and Technology in 
America 43 (1997) (“[L]egal institutions and procedures for dealing with technical 
evidence have remained remarkably static.  Most U.S. judges are still generalists, 
without any special schooling in the sciences, and practices such as random 
assignment of cases prevent judicial specialization in areas requiring technical 
knowledge.”); David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of 
Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 Mich L Rev 223 (2008) 
(describing the problems that district judges face in performing claim construction). 
131 Along with deadwood, incompetents, zealots, turf warriors, cronies, sycophants, 
and overconfident experts.  See William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Frills Textualism, 119 
Harv L Rev 2041, 2058–61 (2006).  The point is not that agencies are models for 
ideal governance, but that they include at least some technical experts, to a greater 
extent than courts.  I thank Adam Samaha for this point. 
132 See Rai, 103 Colum L Rev at 1069 (cited in note 101) (noting the abundant 
resources of the PTO as compared to the district courts and Federal Circuit; in 
Biotechnology, for example, the PTO employs 150 people with Ph.D.’s); Benjamin 
and Rai, 95 Georgetown L J at 310 (cited in note 122) (discussing the institutional 
advantages of administrative agencies over courts, including abundant resources). 
133 For instance, the budget for all federal agencies combined was $1.174 trillion in 
2010.  See Office of Mgmt and Budget, Budget of the US Government: Fiscal Year 
2010 at 28, online at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2010/assets/summary.pdf (visited Oct 3, 
2010). 
134 See Paul R. Michel, Introduction—The Challenge Ahead: Increasing 
Predictability in Federal Circuit Jurisprudence for the New Century, 43 Am U L 
Rev 1231, 1244 (1994) (discussing the limited resources of the court); Adrian 
Vermeule, Should We Have Lay Justices?, 59 Stan L Rev 1569, 1601 (2007) (same); 
see also Michael Rustad and Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social 
Science: Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 NC L Rev 91, 128 (1993) 
(examining the distorted nature of Supreme Court amicus briefs). 
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degree in the relevant field.135  In the course of her training and 
employment, each examiner also becomes proficient in the details of 
patent law.  In addition, PTO examiners benefit from the sheer volume 
of applications.  The typical examiner reviews dozens of patent 
applications in a typical year, all falling within the same technological 
field.136  Consequently, the examiner is afforded a representative 
snapshot of both developments in technology and developments in 
patenting practices; the lowly examiner is most likely expert in 
contemporary trends in patent writing and prosecuting.137  And these 
are merely the lowest rung of employees at the PTO; higher-ups 
possess even greater experience. 
What the PTO currently lacks are staffs of economists138 who 
would be indispensable in formulating broader patent and competition 
policy, as well as disposable funds that could be used to conduct 
broader research.  However, as I noted above, these shortcomings are 
endogenous to the fact that the PTO has no need for such staff 
members or such resources because it lacks substantive authority over 
the law.  Were Congress to endow the Patent Office with greater 
regulatory power, it would be a comparatively trivial matter for it to 
provide it with the funds to hire professional staff and conduct 
research at the same moment.  Indeed, the PTO has already hired a 
chief economist,139 and more staff need not be far behind. 
Compare the Federal Circuit.  Because it was created as a 
specialized court, the Federal Circuit is usually credited with greater 
                                                     
135 See General Requirements Bulletin to the Examination for Admission for 
Registration to Practice in Patent Cases before the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office 4–9, online at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/oed/grb.pdf (visited Nov 4, 2010) 
(detailing the degrees or extent of scientific background necessary to sit for the 
examination). 
136 There are 6,242 patent examiners, see online at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2009/oai_05_wlt_28.html (visited 
Nov 7, 2010), and 485,500 patents were filed in 2009, see online at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2009/oai_05_wlt_02.html (visited 
Nov 7, 2010).  Each examiner is thus charged with examining approximately 78 
patents per year. 
137 “Patent prosecution” is the process of applying for a patent and seeing that 
application through examination to the granting of the patent.  The lawyers who 
shepherd patents through PTO examination are known as “patent prosecutors.” 
138 See Rai, 103 Colum L Rev at 1113 (cited in note 101) (noting that until very 
recently the PTO employed no economists).  
139 See Rai, 157 U Pa L Rev at 2054 (cited in note 102). 
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expertise than the typical judicial body.  Judges on the Federal Circuit 
are fed a steady diet of patent cases and have ample opportunity to 
develop a detailed understanding of patent law, unlike a judge on a 
typical circuit who may see one or fewer of many types of cases each 
year. 
But this regularly accepted perception of expertise is 
misleading.  The Federal Circuit has great experience with patent 
law—not patent policy, much less patent economics.  Judges on the 
Circuit possess a detailed understanding of the workings of patent 
doctrine and the interrelation of various pieces of the patent law,140 but 
this is far from equivalent to the ability to design a sensible patent 
system that provides the correct incentives for inventors and market 
participants.  In fact, it is not even clear that the Federal Circuit is 
trying.  Patent law is now notoriously formalistic141—precisely what 
one might expect when a court attempts to establish judicially 
                                                     
140 Nevertheless, they manage to err in formulating doctrine at an alarming rate.  The 
Federal Circuit could not coalesce around a single methodology for interpreting 
claims for decades, until Phillips v AWH Corp, 415 F3d 1303 (Fed Cir 2005).  Even 
now does not adhere to its own doctrinal prescriptions.  See R. Polk Wagner and Lee 
Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding?  An Empirical Assessment of 
Judicial Performance, 152 U Pa L Rev 1105, 1179 (2004) (finding that the Federal 
Circuit has been only mildly successful in promulgating a coherent and predictable 
doctrine of claim construction).  The Federal Circuit has also become notorious for 
resurrecting old doctrines and applying them in novel, unnecessary ways.  See 
Merges and Duffy, Patent Law and Policy at 299–327 (cited in note 11) (describing 
this phenomenon with respect to the written description requirement); Mark D. Janis, 
On Courts Herding Cats: Contending With the “Written Description" Requirement 
(And Other Unruly Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2 Wash U J L & Pol 55, 60-61 
(2000) (same); Lizardtech, Inc. v Earth Resource Mapping, Inc, 424 F3d 1336 (Fed 
Cir 2005) (developing the doctrine).  To say that the Federal Circuit is adept even 
with patent law doctrine is to afford it the benefit of the doubt. 
141 See, for example, Thomas, 52 Am U L Rev at 792 (cited in note 112) (describing 
a trend of formalism in five areas of patent law jurisprudence); Timothy R. 
Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s Complicity in Federal Circuit Formalism, 20 Santa 
Clara Computer & High Tech L J 1, 1 (2003) (noting that the Federal Circuit has 
recently formulated rules to promote predictability and certainty at the expense of 
fairness, specifically in the areas of patent claim construction and the doctrine of 
equivalents).  This formalism may be due in part to the Federal Circuit’s early 
reliance on the decisions of one of its predecessor courts, the Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals.  See generally Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Constitution of Patent Law: 
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Shape of the Federal Circuit’s 
Jurisprudence, 43 Loy LA L Rev 843 (2010). 
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manageable rules in the absence of expertise or agency input.142  Not 
surprisingly, many extant doctrines seem significantly flawed from the 
perspective of economic theory.  And because every patent case must 
be appealed to the Federal Circuit, there is no jurisdictional 
competition and thus no mechanism that might induce patent doctrine 
to evolve in beneficial directions.143 
The Federal Circuit suffers from many of the same limitations 
as any court.  As a group, Federal Circuit judges had insignificant 
relevant experience, either with patent law or with the technical 
disciplines that surround it, before they were elevated to the court.  Of 
the twelve active judges on the court, only five of them practiced or 
taught patent law before joining the court, only six have even 
undergraduate degrees in technical fields, and none has an advanced 
degree in economics.144  The court may be “expert” in some limited, 
legalistic sense, but that expertise is a poor substitute for genuine 
administrative competence.  It goes almost without saying that the 
district courts and the Supreme Court are no better off.145 
In place of true expertise, courts have expert witnesses.  The 
reliability and usefulness of expert witnesses is of course limited by 
the fact that they are paid advocates for a position, not disinterested 
observers.146  This disadvantage is exacerbated when the expert 
witness must be relied upon to opine on an issue well outside of the 
judge’s area of competence.  The large-scale economic questions 
involved in patent law are precisely those sorts of issues.  Determining 
whether the benefits of patents on business methods outweigh the 
costs, or how stringent the utility requirement should be for gene 
                                                     
142 See Lee, 120 Yale L Rev at 25–30 (cited in note 48); Thomas, 52 Am U L Rev at 
793 (cited in note 141) (attributing the formalistic trend to a preference for rules over 
standards); Rai, 103 Colum L Rev at 1115 (cited in note 101132) (noting the 
decrease in decision-making costs and the increase in predictability from the use of 
formalistic rules). 
143 Consider notes 75–78 and accompanying text. 
144 See Federal Circuit—Judicial Biographies, online at 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judgbios.html (visited Sept 6, 2009). 
145 The Supreme Court can attempt to mitigate its inadequacies by only granting 
certiorari in cases that do not involve difficult technology.  However, that would 
mean foregoing any opportunity to pass on issues involving genetics, 
pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, or any other innovation at the forefront of modern 
technology.  Because these types of technology raise particular, and particularly 
important, questions, this would be a significant detriment to the Court’s proper 
functioning. 
146 See Lee, 120 Yale L J at 18 (cited in note 48). 
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patents, will inevitably require extensive empirical analysis.  
Promising research is already underway.147  But it is unrealistic to 
believe that judges will ever be able to accurately comprehend expert 
testimony on these points.  As one economically proficient federal 
judge put it, “econometrics is such a difficult subject that it is 
unrealistic to expect the average judge or juror to be able to understand 
all the criticisms of an econometric study, no matter how skillful the 
econometrician is in explaining the study to a lay audience.”148 
2.  Procedural advantages.  Agencies are commonly 
understood to possess a variety of “procedural” advantages over 
courts—particularly Article III federal courts—stemming from the 
manner in which they may engage with questions of policy.  Agencies 
can initiate regulatory action when they choose, on the subjects they 
select.  They need not wait for private parties to bring a case 
appropriate for policymaking, as would a court.  Notice-and-comment 
rulemaking authority also permits agencies to solicit opinions from a 
broad spectrum of interested parties, and to test preliminary regulatory 
proposals against outside objections.149  Courts, by contrast, must rely 
predominantly upon the parties’ and amici’s briefs and reports, 
supplemented only occasionally by special masters and outside 
experts.  Here again the supposedly expert Federal Circuit possesses 
no special advantages; it functions like any other federal appellate 
court.  The tools that accompany typical administrative rulemaking are 
thus more adaptable, and more comprehensive, than the typical ad hoc 
systems upon which courts are forced to rely.  A reformed PTO, 
imbued with substantive rule-making authority, would possess this 
range of procedural tools. 
This discussion illustrates a more general point regarding the 
PTO’s procedural capabilities and patent policy.  Over the past several 
centuries, patent lawmaking has proceeded incrementally, as might be 
expected from a common law system.150  This might have been 
adequate in some contexts and as applied to some doctrines, but just as 
                                                     
147 See, for example, David S. Abrams, Did TRIPS Spur Innovation? An Analysis of 
Patent Duration and Incentives to Innovate, 157 U Pa L Rev 1613 (2009). 
148 Posner, 13 J Econ Persp at 96 (cited in note 50). 
149 See 5 USC § 553 (2008) (setting forth the procedural requirements for notice-
and-comment or “informal” rulemaking). 
150 Compare David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U Chi 
L Rev 877 (1996) (analyzing the process of common-law rulemaking in 
constitutional law). 
  
 REGULATING PATENTS 40 
surely it must be suboptimal or ill-suited in others.151  It makes little 
sense to consign an entire field of law to one mode of development 
and reform when others are available.152 
3.  Political responsiveness and agency capture.  The final two 
canonical institutional design considerations—an agency’s 
responsiveness to public opinion, and the extent to which an agency is 
subject to outside “capture” and therefore biased decision-making—
are essentially two sides of the same coin.  On the one hand, an 
advantage typically ascribed to agencies over courts is the political 
nature of the former: their connection to the elected branches of 
government.153  If regulation involves political considerations or 
tradeoffs, then they are best delegated to an institutional actor, such as 
an agency, over which the political branches can exercise authority.154  
It is difficult to hold judges accountable if their decisions cease to 
serve the public interest.  Chevron deference is frequently defended on 
these terms.  Because regulatory choices are, at their core, 
discretionary matters of policy and politics, silences and ambiguities in 
statutes are best read as invitations for agencies, not courts, to make 
law.155 
At the same time, a court’s insulation from ordinary political 
processes and from the actors who might seek to influence it can 
                                                     
151 Indeed, it is conceivable that the present shape of patent law has been determined 
in part by the procedural shortcomings of the federal courts as patent policymakers.  
Even if the Federal Circuit (for instance) were to believe a putative change in the law 
beneficial, it might nonetheless shy away from initiating such a change if it believed 
its own institutional tools inadequate to the task of legal reform.  Compare Warner-
Jenkinson Co, Inc v Hilton Davis Chemical Co, 520 US 17, 28 (1997) (“Congress 
can legislate the doctrine of equivalents out of existence any time it chooses.  The 
various policy arguments now made by both sides are thus best addressed to 
Congress, not this Court.”); Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 
Harv L Rev 1 (1979) (analyzing courts’ suitability as venues for “structural” 
litigation in pursuit of broad and ongoing social reform). 
152 Compare Rai, 103 Colum L Rev 1035 (cited in note Error! Bookmark not 
defined.) (suggesting collaboration between Congress, the courts, and the PTO). 
153 See Mark Seidenfeld, The Psychology of Accountability and Political Review of 
Agency Rules, 51 Duke L J 1059, 1068–93 (2001) (describing and assessing 
executive and legislative oversight of agency rulemaking). 
154 See Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 
Mich L Rev 53 (2008) (arguing that the optimal arrangement may be some type of 
power-sharing between agencies and the President); Jonathan S. Masur and Jonathan 
Remy Nash, The Institutional Dynamics of Transition Relief, 85 NYU L Rev 391, 
435–440 (2010). 
155 See Chevron, 467 US at 843–44. 
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provide certain advantages.  Like any politically influenced organ of 
government, administrative agencies are subject to inducements and 
pressures from private outside actors who may have preferences that 
diverge widely from the best interests of society at large.156  This 
problem can be exacerbated for agencies, which deal repeatedly with 
the same industries and often the same firms in the course of 
regulating a single field or area of the economy.  The fear is that 
repeated lobbying, along with the movement of staff members 
between the private and public sector, will leave agencies beholden to 
the industries they are meant to regulate or inculcated with those 
industries’ own preferences and priorities.157 
Courts are not entirely immune from capture, however.  Judges 
operate within an elite legal community and seek reputational benefits 
and status within that community,158 and most judges are former 
lawyers drawn from that community.  Occasionally judges retire and 
resume careers as lawyers.159  Conceivably, then, courts are subject to 
a similar type of capture by actors within the legal community.  This 
possibility grows as the size of the relevant community shrinks and the 
frequency of judges’ interactions with the same attorneys increases.160 
This is the terrain on which the battles over choice of 
institutional actor are fought, and thus far these arguments have 
neither dissuaded Congress from vesting agencies with tremendous 
regulatory power nor convinced proponents of agency capture 
theories.  On this ground, at least, the PTO fares no worse than the 
typical administrative agency.  There is no reason to believe that it is 
less politically responsive or more subject to capture than the EPA, 
FDA, or any other of its peers.  On the usual administrative law terms, 
                                                     
156 Masur and Nash, 85 NYU L Rev at 445–47 (cited in note 154). 
157 See generally Nicholas Bagley and Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of 
the Regulatory State, 106 Colum L Rev 1260, 1284–92 (2006); Kieff, 157 U Penn L 
Rev at 1949–50 (cited in note 123). 
158 See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same 
Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 Sup Ct Econ Rev 1, 13 (1993). 
159 See, for example, Jerry Markon, Appeals Court Judge Leaves Life Appointment 
for Boeing, Wash Post (May 1, 2006), online at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/05/10/AR2006051000929.html (visited Nov 7, 2010) 
(describing the resignation of Judge Michael Luttig, formerly of the Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit). 
160 See Thomas, 52 Am U L Rev at 792–94 (cited in note 112) (suggesting that the 
Federal Circuit has been captured). 
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the PTO can make out at minimum a prima facie case for regulatory 
authority commensurate with similarly situated agencies. 
In fact, however, the case for the PTO is stronger than even 
this first-order picture would indicate.  Structural features of the 
market for patents should render the PTO less susceptible to capture 
than many other typical agencies, and better situated vis à vis the 
federal courts than most agencies.  The regulated community that must 
deal with the PTO is larger than for nearly any other administrative 
agency.  The PTO’s ambit includes every private entity that engages in 
any sort of research or development, a larger cohort than the class of 
firms that release pollutants (EPA), or produce consumables (FDA), or 
engage in collective bargaining (NLRB).  Because the PTO interacts 
with a broader and more diverse regulated community, it will be more 
difficult for any single firm or industry to gain sway over the agency. 
Moreover, many parties that interact with the PTO lack strong 
interests either for or against stringent patent protection.  Most high-
technology firms both hold patents and face competitors with their 
own overlapping patent portfolios.  Accordingly, it is uncertain 
whether these firms would benefit or be harmed if patents were 
strengthened or weakened.161  In any event, without decisive lobbying 
objectives, these parties should have little interest in even attempting 
to capture the PTO. 
Of course, as with any agency, there are firms with divergent 
private interests before the PTO.  In particular, the brand-name 
pharmaceutical industry is viewed as the primary modern beneficiary 
of powerful patent protection and the industry most likely to invest 
                                                     
161 See Burk and Lemley, The Patent Crisis at 160–64 (cited in note 4) (arguing that 
the software industry’s patent crisis is due to the ill-defined scope of software patents 
and the lax standards with which they are issued); Leon Radomsky, Sixteen Years 
After the Passage of the US Semiconductor Chip Protection Act:  Is International 
Protection Working?, 15 Berkeley Tech L J 1049, 1054 (2000) (asserting that patents 
are not useful in the semiconductor industry because the complexity of the 
technology makes obtaining a patent impractical); Robert L. Risberg, Jr., Comment, 
Five Years Without Infringement Litigation Under the Semiconductor Chip 
Protection Act:  Unmasking the Spectre of Chip Piracy in an Era of Diverse and 
Incompatible Process Technologies, 1990 Wis L Rev 241, 252 (“[T]he design that 
makes one chip’s layout better than another’s is generally not patentable.”); Clarisa 
Long, Institutions and Interest Groups in Patent and Copyright Law 10 (unpublished 
manuscript 2007).  Long ascribes the lack of congressional attention to patents, as a 
historical matter, to this phenomenon. 
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resources in lobbying for greater patent rights.162  There has been 
movement toward extending patent rights for drug companies,163 but 
those trends are, by and large, neither significant nor contemporary.  
The explanation for the pharmaceutical industry’s general failure to 
secure most extensive patent rights is likely found in the fact that it is 
opposed by powerful interests as well: consumer groups—including 
such dominant national organizations as the AARP, which is 
concerned about rising prices of drugs for senior citizens—and generic 
pharmaceutical companies.164  The presence of these countervailing 
forces places the PTO in a situation far different from, for instance, the 
EPA.  That agency regulates vast numbers of businesses, all of whom 
would likely prefer a slackening in regulation, counterbalanced only 
by a handful of comparatively weaker environmental groups.165  There 
is little reason to suspect that the PTO will have as much difficulty 
evading improper outside influence as the canonical administrative 
body. 
 
B.  THE ADVANTAGES OF PTO INVOLVEMENT 
 
As the previous section argued indicates, there seems little 
reason to favor administrative involvement in highly technical 
regulatory fields such as environmental and securities law while 
simultaneously disfavoring it for patent law.  Yet there are advantages 
to bestowing substantive rule-making authority upon the PTO that 
transcend that meager justification.  This section sketches out two of 
the most important. 
                                                     
162 See Bessen and Meurer, Patent Failure at 88–89 (cited in note 4) (noting the high 
value of patent protection to the pharmaceutical industry compared to most other 
industries); Jaffe and Lerner, Innovation and Its Discontents at 39–41 (cited in note 
4) (asserting that patent protection provides incentives for drug development that would 
otherwise be uneconomical). 
163 The Hatch-Waxman Act is an example of this movement, though it involved 
tradeoffs and was not entirely beneficial to the prescription drug industry.  See 
generally Henry Grabowski, Patents and New Product Development in the 
Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Industries, 8 Georgetown Pub Pol Rev 7 (2003) 
(describing the tradeoffs involved in that legislation); Scott Hemphill, Paying for 
Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 NYU 
L Rev 1553 (2006) (same). 
164 Clarisa Long, Institutions and Interest Groups at 10 (cited in note 161). 
165 Nonetheless, over the EPA’s lifetime, a period of intense industry lobbying, the 
agency’s trend has been towards more extensive and stricter regulation of pollutants, 
not a loosening of its grip. 
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1.  Substantive rules and information gathering.  One of the 
principal goals of any organized system is to ensure that information 
flows to the decision-makers most in need of it, or best positioned to 
make use of it.  Achieving this goal is a matter of bureaucratic 
structure and incentives.  The parties with the capacity to gather 
information must have the proper incentives to invest in obtaining it 
and passing it along to the higher-value users, and they must have the 
capacity to do so.  This problem is difficult enough to solve within a 
government bureaucracy that lacks any market pricing mechanism that 
could set incentives.  But the problem becomes even more difficult 
when the institution positioned to gather information and the 
institution in need of that information are housed under separate 
organizational roofs. 
This is the state of play in patent law.  The PTO grants nearly 
300,000 patents per year, and in doing so accumulates vast amounts of 
information on a variety of topics integral to the patent law.  To name 
just a few examples, the PTO is positioned to learn what the state of 
the art is in any given industry, and thus what sorts of inventions 
would be truly novel and non-obvious; the level of technical expertise 
of a person of ordinary skill in a given field, which is the standard 
upon which much of the patent law is based; and the ways in which 
patent drafters in various fields employ particular terms of art and 
describe particular types of inventions.  Yet the PTO cannot make use 
of this information directly because it lacks control over the 
substantive patent law. 
The Federal Circuit, by contrast, sees only a very small fraction 
of all patents—it decided fewer than 300 patent cases in 2008,166 for 
instance—and nothing approaching a representative sample.  In 
addition, whereas patent applications come into the PTO’s hands 
immediately upon filing, the Federal Circuit typically sees a patent 
only years after it was filed.  The patent must first wend its way 
through the PTO, be allegedly infringed by another party, and then 
progress through lengthy litigation at the district court level.  This 
process takes more than twelve years on average.167  Accordingly, the 
Federal Circuit possesses very little information regarding the current 
state of technology in any field, and its level of knowledge is 
                                                     
166 This is based on a search of the Westlaw database using the word “patent.”  The 
results were then culled to remove any cases that did not involve the decision of any 
patent-related issue. 
167 Burk and Lemley, The Patent Crisis at 57 (cited in note 4). 
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particularly lacking in the quickly developing technological fields 
where it might be most useful. 
This lack of information hamstrings the Federal Circuit’s 
efforts at formulating sound policy.  As an initial matter, the Federal 
Circuit undoubtedly makes significant errors when deciding difficult 
technical questions.  Without a current, ongoing understanding of the 
state of a given technological field, the Federal Circuit can hardly be 
expected to ascertain how a person of ordinary skill in the art would 
understand a patent, or whether that person would have found a 
particular invention obvious.  And these deficiencies do not touch on 
even more complex questions involving the doctrines of utility and 
obviousness, for example. 
This is not to say that the Federal Circuit has no means of 
obtaining information from the patent office.  The PTO regularly 
produces non-binding Guidelines for its examiners, to which the 
Federal Circuit could defer if it so chose.  Or the court could simply 
solicit information and guidance from the PTO in particular cases or in 
the course of formulating particular doctrines.  Generally speaking, 
however, the Federal Circuit has done neither of these things.  It grants 
no deference to PTO guidelines, and it does not ask for the PTO’s 
advice or guidance.  In re Fisher168 is illustrative of this attitude.  In 
that case, the PTO rejected a patent filing pursuant to its own 
Examination Guidelines, and the patentee appealed to the Federal 
Circuit.  The court eventually upheld the PTO’s decision and validated 
the agency’s approach in the Guidelines, but it granted no particular 
deference to the patent office—not even weak Skidmore deference, 
much less genuine Chevron deference.169  The Federal Circuit treated 
the PTO as merely another litigant. 
It is worth pausing to note that there is one respect in which 
courts would seem better institutionally situated than agencies in this 
field.  The federal courts adjudicate issues related to both patent 
validity and patent infringement, while the PTO encounters only 
questions of patent validity.170  This might seem to provide the courts 
                                                     
168 421 F3d 1365 (Fed Cir 2005). 
169 See id at 1372 (noting only that “[t]he PTO’s standards for assessing whether a 
claimed invention has a specific and substantial utility comport with this court’s 
interpretation of the utility requirement of § 101”).  Under the Chevron line of cases, 
agency actions that are not entitled to Chevron deference frequently receive 
deference “according to [their] persuasiveness,” which is known as Skidmore 
deference.  US v. Mead Corp, 533 US 218, 221 (2001). 
170 Burk and Lemley, The Patent Crisis at 107 (cited in note 4). 
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with at least one informational advantage.171  But again, the PTO’s 
singular focus on validity is an artifact of the PTO having never been 
delegated any authority over issues of infringement.  Moreover, the 
issues surrounding infringement—determining when injunctions are 
appropriate,172 calculating reasonable royalties,173 etc.—are no less 
technically complex than other patent questions.174  If the PTO were 
tasked with setting rules to govern infringement, there is similar 
reason to believe that it would outperform the courts.175 
It is something of a puzzle that the Federal Circuit has not 
made better use of the PTO as an informational resource.  Why, after 
all, should it not avail itself of all available means of improving its 
jurisprudence?  The answer likely lies with the political economy of 
patent law, and in particular the institutional rivalry between the 
Federal Circuit and the PTO.  The Federal Circuit is, first and 
foremost, a patent court.  The remainder of its docket is comparatively 
insignificant.  It was created to function as an expert overseer of the 
patent law, and undoubtedly its judges continue to understand their 
roles very much in those terms.176  Consequently, the Federal Circuit 
                                                     
171 Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the most important infringement doctrines 
have direct analogues in doctrines of patent validity: literal infringement parallels 
novelty, while the doctrine of equivalents is very similar to obviousness.  See 
Merges and Duffy, Patent Law and Policy at 781–877 (cited in note 11) 
172 35 USC § 283. 
173 35 USC § 284. 
174 Burk and Lemley, The Patent Crisis at 129 (cited in note 4) (suggesting that a 
reasonable royalty should be determined by “the profit margin that a company might 
expect and the royalty rate common in licenses in that industry”); id at 160 
(suggesting that the likelihood of holdup problems should drive decisions regarding 
injunctions). 
175 It is possible that the PTO should also be granted the authority to hear suits for 
patent infringement in the first instance, just as administrative law judges currently 
adjudicate regulatory cases across a wide variety of federal agencies (with parties 
holding rights of appeal to the federal courts).  See The Federal Administrative Law 
Judges Conference, FALJC’s Mission, Constitution, and Bylaws, online at 
http://005754d.netsolhost.com/faljc1.html (visited Jan 6, 2011).  Full consideration 
of this possibility is both beyond the scope of this Article and somewhat to the side 
of it; the argument here principally concerns which institution will determine 
substantive patent law rules, and the PTO need not have adjudicative authority to 
fulfill that role.  I pause only to note that a shift to agency adjudication is not 
inconsistent with the approach advocated here. 
176 See The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub L No 97-164, 96 Stat 25 
(1982) (codified in various sections of Title 28) (establishing the Federal Circuit); 
Harry F. Manbeck Jr., The Federal Circuit—First Ten Years of Patentability 
Decisions, 14 Geo Mason U L Rev 499, 499 (1992) (“It was expected that the 
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has been loath to cede any authority or even any hint of primacy to the 
PTO, its main institutional competitor.177  In addition to refusing to 
afford any deference to the PTO’s view of the law, the Federal Circuit 
notably declined to review even the PTO’s findings of fact with the 
level of deference mandated by the Administrative Procedure Act,178 
until the Supreme Court finally forced it to do so.179 
For its part, the PTO has little incentive to invest in 
information.  It has nothing to gain from plying the Federal Circuit 
with knowledge that the court will not use.  Even if the Federal Circuit 
were to make use of the information, it surely would not credit the 
PTO with having provided it.  Nor can the PTO realize any advantage 
by challenging the Federal Circuit directly.  Absent intervention from 
Congress or the Supreme Court, two parties that rarely engage with the 
patent law, the PTO holds no playable cards.  The PTO typically 
behaves accordingly: nearly all of its guidance documents merely 
parrot Federal Circuit caselaw.180  Independent PTO efforts to shape 
the law are extremely rare and nearly always unsuccessful.  By 
consequence, the large quantities of information generated in the PTO 
sit uncollected and unutilized. 
If the PTO disagrees with the courts as to the appropriate 
content of patent law, it is almost certainly best for the patent system 
and for society if the PTO simply states (and acts upon) its preferences 
directly.  This would allow information to reach the public.  The PTO 
has strong incentives not to pursue this course, however, because to do 
so would invite reversal and its attendant costs.181 
Accordingly, the PTO might well attempt to accomplish 
effectively the same substantive ends through more sub rosa means.  
                                                                                                                             
Federal Circuit would provide uniform application and interpretation of the patent 
law.”); Robert L. Harmon, Patents and the Federal Circuit 1162 (BNA Books 8th ed 
2007) (“The Federal Circuit was created, in part, for the purpose of achieving 
uniformity in the exposition and application of substantive patent law.”). 
177 See Jonathan Masur et al, Who Defines the Law?  USPTO Rulemaking Authority, 
8 Nw U J Tech & Intell Prop 410 (2010), online at 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/njtip/v8/n3/5 (visited Nov 13, 2010). 
178 5 USC § 706(2)(A). 
179 See Dickinson v Zurko, 527 US 150, 163 (1999) (holding that the Federal Circuit 
must review PTO findings of fact with deference). 
180 See Megan E. Lyman, Judicial Fitness for Review of Complex Biotechnology 
Issues in Patent Litigation: Technical Claim Interpretation, 23 J NAALJ 503, 509 
(2003) (noting that PTO guidelines incorporate Federal Circuit opinions and do little 
else). 
181 See Masur, Patent Inflation at 17–18 (cited in note 105). 
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In particular, the PTO may attempt to use its control over patent 
examinations to enforce a de facto substantive law that is opaque and 
effectively unreviewable. 
Imagine, for example, that the PTO does not believe that 
strands of the human genome should be patentable.  The patent office 
can raise the costs of obtaining a patent on this type of invention in a 
variety of ways.  It can allocate resources away from the relevant 
technological field and reduce the number of working examiners, 
causing applications to pile up and lengthening the time it takes for 
them to be granted.  It can instruct its examiners to search more 
diligently for prior art, raising the probability that an application will 
be rejected and an inventor will be forced to re-draft claims.  And it 
can use what little discretionary authority it has in extending deadlines 
or granting additional leave to file to discriminate among 
technological fields.182  These mechanisms will increase the 
transaction costs of getting a patent, and in some cases they may even 
serve to block a patent from issuing.  Even where the patent eventually 
issues and where the transaction costs are insignificant,183 the delay 
itself can be extremely costly for a patentee.  Delay reduces the 
effective length of the patent term because the twenty-year term begins 
running when the application is first filed, and it can result in millions 
or billions of dollars in lost revenues for patentees.184 
These sorts of pathologies are neither unique to the PTO nor 
necessarily rare within the administrative state.  Nearly any executive-
branch organization possessing enforcement power but not lawmaking 
power may use its enforcement discretion to affect the de facto content 
                                                     
182 The PTO’s recent efforts to limit the number of continuation applications that a 
patentee can file as a matter of right can be understood in this vein.  Under the 
PTO’s final rules, the office retained discretion to allow parties leave to file 
additional continuation applications under certain sets of circumstances.  The PTO 
may well have envisioned this additional discretion as another mechanism for 
selecting among types of technology and fields of potentially patentable subject 
matter. 
183 See Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and Patent Examination at 24–29  J Legal 
Analysis (forthcoming 2010), online at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1105184 
(visited Nov 7, 2010) (comparing the low cost of obtaining a patent with the value of 
a profitable invention). 
184 This is a particularly pressing issue for pharmaceutical companies, which 
frequently reap substantial income throughout the life of a patent and depend upon a 
lengthy patent term to fund the expensive clinical trials required to bring a patent to 
market.  See Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of 
Patentability, 87 Tex L Rev 503, 504–05 (2009); see also note 162. 
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of the substantive law.  This phenomenon has been observed most 
notably in the criminal law,185 and it may exist in a variety of other 
legal fields as well.186  Yet its operation in patent law is different for 
one important reason: unlike other fields of law, there is no explicit 
element of discretion vested in the PTO.  Unlike any prosecutor, the 
PTO must accept every filed application and is obligated to grant 
every patent that is valid under the Patent Act.  The PTO is expected 
to function, ideally, as an automaton.  Accordingly, the PTO possesses 
no official policymaking space; there is no sense in which the patent 
office’s ability to promote or delay certain applications could be 
understood or justified as a purposeful, systemic means of agenda-
setting.  When the PTO subverts the Federal Circuit’s intentions 
regarding the patent law, it is acting beyond the contemplated 
boundaries of the patent system. 
By contrast, a PTO imbued with the authority to make 
substantive legal rules would possess both the ability and the incentive 
to draw upon the information it is positioned to gather.  The PTO 
could collect information from both outsiders and its own examiners.  
It could conduct studies analyzing the types of patents filed and the 
state of the art in various technological fields.  And it could even enlist 
economists in performing larger-scale studies to determine the 
economic value of particular doctrines. 
Importantly, these PTO policy innovations would be 
substantially resistant to Federal Circuit intervention.  If the PTO were 
to employ notice-and-comment rulemaking, like any other similarly 
situated administrative agency it would be entitled to Chevron 
deference in its interpretations of the Patent Act.  Because the Act is 
phrased in such general, ambiguous terms,187 in most cases this 
deference should be decisive.  This is not to say that the Federal 
Circuit would have no oversight role; PTO regulations would still 
undergo arbitrary and capricious review in the Circuit.  But for the 
most part the PTO would be able to implement policy without fear of 
                                                     
185 See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich L 
Rev 505, 506 (2001). 
186 See Adam B. Cox and Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration 
Law, 119 Yale L J 458, 520 (2009). 
187 See, for example, 35 USC § 101 (2009) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new 
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and 
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions 
and requirements of this title.”).  The statute does not define “new,” “useful,” 
“composition of matter,” or any of its other relevant terms. 
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being summarily overturned by the Federal Circuit.  Accordingly, the 
PTO would have the proper motivation to challenge the Federal 
Circuit where appropriate. 
2.  Particularized patent advantages.  Armed with this 
information, the PTO could conceivably adjust a variety of patent 
doctrines with greater precision than an inexpert court can achieve.  
Patent law differs importantly from other legal fields because of the 
scope and specificity of the technologies involved.  One case may 
require detailed scrutiny of semiconductor designs; another may 
demand an analysis of gene sequencing.  In response to this great 
variety of technological issues, and because they are not skilled in the 
relevant technologies, patent law has officially embraced a doctrine of 
technological neutrality: patent doctrines should not differentiate 
between technologies.  Accordingly, courts have constructed a number 
of general rules that operate across technological fields.188 
Yet this is despite the fact that there is little reason to believe 
that all fields should be treated equivalently.  Moreover, each new 
patent case demands that the courts reapply this general standard to the 
relevant technology, which is a difficult and time-consuming exercise.  
Some scholars believe that the courts have already attempted to design 
field-specific patent rules, though frequently without success.189  The 
PTO could improve upon these doctrines by drafting technology-
specific rules that more accurately reflect the state of the art and 
reduce the decision costs of courts that must comb through the 
technologies.  This section highlights three particular areas in which 
PTO rulemaking could lead to marked improvements. 
First, consider the role of the “person having ordinary skill in 
the art” (the “PHOSITA”) in patent law.  Much like the “reasonable 
person” in tort law, the PHOSITA is a construct used to define a 
variety of patent doctrines.  An invention is obvious if a PHOSITA 
would find it obvious;190 a patent sufficiently enables the underlying 
invention (per section 112 of the Patent Act) if it would teach a 
PHOSITA how to create the invention.191  The PHOSITA allows 
courts to decide patent cases without assembling any systematic 
                                                     
188 See Burk and Lemley, 89 Va L Rev at 1630–75 (cited in note 66). 
189 See Burk & Lemley, The Patent Crisis at 109–30 (cited in note 4). 
190 See, for example, Geo M. Martin Co v. Alliance Machine Systems Intern LLC, 
618 F3d 1294, 1302–03 (Fed Cir 2010). 
191 See, for example, Forest Laboratories, Inc v Ivax Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 501 F3d 
1263, 1266 (Fed Cir 2007). 
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understanding of the state the art in any technological field—they need 
only decide what a PHOSITA would have understood regarding the 
technology at issue.192  A consequence of this approach is that no case 
creates meaningful precedent regarding skill in the art.  Courts’ 
conclusions as to how a given PHOSITA would treat a particular 
technology are of essentially no use beyond the four corners of the 
opinions in which they are issued.  Far preferable would be particular 
legal findings regarding the state of the art or the level of available 
knowledge in a given field, findings that could govern future cases and 
allow private parties to adjust their patenting behavior accordingly.  
For reasons likely related to its lack of information, the Federal Circuit 
has shied away from this course. 
By contrast, the PTO could employ the expertise of its 
examiners directly to determine the level of ability and knowledge of a 
person having ordinary skill in the art in any number of technical 
fields.  It could then incorporate this information into a set of 
regulations, updated regularly, which would then govern the many 
PHOSITA-related questions arising in patent cases in those fields.193  
Note that the PTO already is forced to ascertain the level of skill of the 
PHOSITA in the course of assessing essentially every patent 
application for obviousness.  It seems absurd to waste the enormous 
amounts of information generated through this process, rather than 
standardizing it and applying it to both examinations and court cases.  
Moreover, a consistently updated set of regulations would create a 
permanent record of the changing level of skill in the art over time.  
Courts could draw upon this database when adjudicating infringement 
actions that arise years after a patent has issued, rather than having to 
rely upon experts and guesswork to ascertain the appropriate level of 
skill in the art in a bygone era. 
Second, the PTO could set forth a set of rules for construing 
patent claims.  These rules could take into account the specifications, 
prosecution history, and available extrinsic evidence based on the 
                                                     
192 It is worth noting that the PHOSITA must be defined not just by technological 
field but by time: a person with ordinary skill in the art would know more about 
computers in 2010 than in 1960. 
193 If this seems too rigid, these regulations could be structured instead as rebuttable 
presumptions.  The PHOSITA would be presumed to have the knowledge and skill 
embodied in the relevant PTO regulation unless a litigant demonstrated otherwise 
with expert testimony.  The PTO could even select the proper evidentiary standard: a 
preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, or something in 
between. 
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PTO’s broad-based knowledge, acquired in the course of examining 
hundreds of thousands of patents, regarding how patent drafters 
commonly employ language and structure.  The Federal Circuit’s 
efforts in this area have been halting and uncertain.  Current law is 
little more than an admonition to consider each factor in turn, and to 
an unspecified extent.194  Not surprisingly, the Federal Circuit’s 
jurisprudence is viewed as largely unsuccessful.195  The rate of 
reversal of district court opinions is very high, and district court judges 
do not appear to improve with experience.196  It would not be difficult 
for the PTO to improve upon this record. 
Third, at the outer reaches of possibility, a properly 
empowered patent office could consider varying the length of the 
patent term among different industries.197  It is entirely likely that the 
standard twenty-year term is inappropriate for all patents in all fields; 
it persists in part because Congress and the courts lack the resources 
and skill necessary to adjust it.  The PTO could combine the expertise 
of its examiners in understanding how research is conducted in various 
fields with the analysis of economists to determine whether deviations 
                                                     
194 See Phillips v AWH Corp, 415 F3d 1303, 1314–18 (Fed Cir 2005) (en banc) 
(explaining that district court judges should consider the language of the claims 
themselves, the specifications, the prosecution history, and also extrinsic evidence 
when construing patent claims). 
195 See Wagner and Petherbridge, 152 U Pa L Rev (cited in note 140) (illustrating the 
failings of Federal Circuit claim construction doctrine and the Federal Circuit’s own 
treatment of that doctrine).  
196 See Schwartz, 107 Mich L Rev (cited in note 130) (noting the low rate at which 
the Federal Circuit affirms claim construction judgments and the fact that district 
judges do not appear to improve their success rates with experience).  This is not 
even to speak of the mind-bending contradictions inherent to Federal Circuit 
doctrine, such as the mutually contradictory notions that claims “must be read in 
view of the specification, of which they are a part,” Markman, 52 F3d at 978, on the 
one hand, and that the courts “should not import limitations from the specifications 
into the claims.”  ICU Medical, Inc v Alaris Medical Systems, Inc, 558 F3d 1368, 
1375 (Fed Cir 2009).  Not to mention the fact that the written description 
requirement demands that the specification “describe the manner and process of 
making and using . . . the full scope of the invention,” Lizardtech, Inc v Earth 
Resources Mapping, Inc, 424 F3d 1336, 1344–45 (Fed Cir 2005), which also seems 
inconsistent with the admonition against reading limitations from the specification 
into the claims. 
197 This might run afoul of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) and might thus be unworkable absent an internationally 
negotiated amendment to that treaty.  See Burk and Lemley, The Patent Crisis at 20 
(cited in note 4).  It is in that sense in particular that this option is especially far-
fetched. 
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from the standard term are warranted.  And the PTO, unlike any other 
institutional actor, already has experience in sorting patents into 
categories based on technical field: It classifies newly-filed 
applications according to type of technology in order to assign them to 
the proper examiners. 
 
C.  PROSPECTS FOR REFORM 
 
Irrespective of the wisdom of delegating substantive 
rulemaking authority to the PTO, it might appear unlikely that 
Congress will act simply because it has not done so thus far.  The very 
fact that the allocation of institutional authority remains unchanged, 
despite the Federal Circuit’s documented failings, might be taken as 
evidence that Congress will not alter it in the future.  In addition, if 
Congress does grant the PTO rulemaking authority and the agency 
misuses that power, it might be advisable for Congress to strip the 
PTO of authority and return to the status quo ante.  Yet if it is difficult 
to persuade Congress to make one change, it might be impossible to 
convince it to make a second. 
This is a type of objection that might be raised against any 
proposal for legislative reform—if the idea is so beneficial, why has 
Congress not acted upon it already?  But it is strengthened somewhat 
in the context of patent law, where Congress has not enacted any 
significant legal change in more than fifty years.  It is possible that a 
powerful coalition of patent interest groups favor the status quo, or 
that interest in legal change is simply too minimal to spur 
congressional action.198  This may also be a particularly difficult type 
of reform to enact.  As I note above, Congress very rarely (if ever) 
grants an agency authority to make rules concerning a judge-made 
body of law.199   
At the same time, there has never been any serious attempt to 
transfer substantive rule-making authority to the PTO or any strong 
advocate for such a move.  It may simply be an idea whose time has 
not yet arrived.  A transfer of institutional authority also involves 
different political dynamics than a substantive change in the law.  It is 
clearer who the winners and losers will be from a substantive change 
than from a reallocation of decisional authority, and thus perhaps 
easier to reallocate authority when private parties have entrenched 
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interests.  Congress is also likelier to grant power to an agency when it 
is uncertain as to the proper policy course.200  If Congress is 
dissatisfied with the Federal Circuit but lacks the information 
necessary to make sound substantive patent judgments, it might turn 
instead to the PTO. 
In the end, it may well be that the prospects for institutional 
change are slim.  But given the failings of the current system, there is 
no reason not to try. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For years, federal judges have decided patent cases pursuant to 
doctrine and precedent without any clear indication regarding the 
wisdom of the policies they were attempting to promote.  The result is 
a set of patent rules that in many contexts appears broken.  Yet the 
courts can hardly be blamed for the mess; they were never meant to 
manage policy in an area as fraught with technological and economic 
complexity as patent law.  Bilski lays bare this fundamental 
institutional weakness.  Faced with a crucial issue of patentability that 
might affect the shape of several major areas of economic activity, the 
Supreme Court had no choice but to fall back upon doctrine and 
precedent, legal tools that have proven entirely inadequate to the task 
at hand.  For its part, Congress has played no meaningful role in 
managing the patent system for more than half a century. 
Because the courts have appeared incapable—and the 
legislature uninterested—it is time to consider other institutional 
arrangements.  Rather than continuing to rely upon the federal courts 
to fumble towards a workable patent policy, Congress should 
authorize the Patent and Trademark Office to make rules with the 
force of law.  The case for vesting substantive regulatory authority in 
the PTO is perhaps even stronger than for the typical administrative 
agency.  Unlike the Federal Circuit, the PTO would be able to muster 
resources and expertise in addressing the crucial economic and 
technical issues that underlay patent law.  The PTO could even 
innovate further, creating field-specific rules of patent scope, 
interpretation, or even duration.  There is no principled justification for 
                                                     
200 See generally David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran, Delegating Powers: A 
Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers 34–
38 (Cambridge 1999) (describing Congress as facing a decision whether to “make” 
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the arrangement that has left patent law governed by the courts while 
other similarly technical areas such as environmental law or securities 
law are run by agencies.  It is merely a historical accident—and one 
that Congress should rectify. 
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